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Summary 
This thesis has its focus on the interaction between competition law and the 
public procurement regime. Since the two systems have the same objective 
of the creation of an internal market it is vital that the two systems reach 
coherence. Despite this there is now express provision on the importance to 
fight anti competitive behaviour in the Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC. 
On March 28th 2014 the new Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU were 
published in the OJ. Prior to the modernised and new Directive the Green 
Paper emphasized that it is vital to avoid distortion of competition and 
generate the strongest possible competition on the public procurement 
market.   
 
The purpose with the thesis is therefore to analyse the new Public Sector 
Directive 2014/24/EU in order to see how the changes can create effective 
competition on the public market and how they can affect the tenderers’ 
possibility to create and sustain collusive agreements, which is prohibited 
under Article 101 TFEU. Competition is of essence in a system of tendering 
and when the tenderers engage in anti competitive behaviour it undermines 
the contracting authorities’ possibility to reach best value for money.  
 
The public procurement market is a risk zone for collusive agreements (bid 
rigging) due to various reasons. The risk factors relates to both the market 
structure and the public procurement process. One of the most important 
risk factors is that transparency permeates the entire process. Because of this 
bid rigging on the public market tends to be very stable and due to this the 
leniency programmes does not reach its full potential on the public 
procurement market. Therefore the contracting authorities have a decisive 
role in the prevention and detection of bid rigging. OECD has published 
guidelines on how such prevention and detection can be done. However, it 
is questioned whether such guidance is enough or whether there is a need of 
legislative instruments.  
 
Despite the importance of fighting anti competitive behaviour there is not a 
lot of the legislative changes in the new Directive that has as its primary 
purpose to prevent this kind of behaviour. However, the changes are capable 
of creating a more accessible market for SMEs and the barriers to entry can 
be lowered. This will result in more participation and the creation of 
effective competition, which in turn has the effect of decreasing the 
tenderers’ possibility to create and sustain collusive agreements. A few of 
the changes are minimum requirements and others are discretionary, 
therefore the outcome and creation of effective competition will be 
dependent on how the Directive is implemented in the different Member 
States. One of the conclusions to be drawn is that the legislator could have 
gone much further in its efforts to create a more pro competitive Directive 
on public procurement.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats belyser ett område där den offentlig upphandling möter 
konkurrenslagstiftningen. De två lagstiftningarna delar målet att uppnå en 
inre marknad och det är därför av stor vikt att de två regleringarna 
samspelar. Trots detta finns det inte någon uttrycklig bestämmelse om att 
förhindra konkurrensbegränsade samarbete i det nu gällande klassiska 
direktivet 2004/18/EC om offentlig upphandling. Den 28:e mars 
publicerades det nya klassiska direktivet 2014/24/EU om offentlig 
upphandling i EUT. Den Grönbok som publicerades föregående det 
moderniserade och nya direktivet belyste vikten av att undvika snedvridning 
av konkurrensen och vikten av att skapa största möjliga konkurrens på den 
offentliga upphandlingsmarknaden.  
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är således att analysera det nya klassiska 
direktivet 2014/24/EU för att belysa hur de ändringar som har gjorts har 
möjlighet att skapa en effektiv konkurrens på den offentliga marknaden och 
även hur de kan påverka anbudsgivarnas möjlighet att skapa och 
upprätthålla anbudskarteller, vilket anses konkurrensbegränsande och 
förbjudet enligt Artikel 101 FEUF. När budgivning ligger till grund för 
tilldelningen av avtal är konkurrens en avgörande faktor. Om anbudsgivarna 
sluter konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten motverkas de upphandlande 
myndigheternas möjlighet att uppnå mesta möjliga valuta för pengarna. 
 
Marknaden för offentlig upphandling är en riskzon för 
konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten p.g.a. olika faktorer, både relaterade till 
marknadsstrukturen och den offentliga upphandlingsprocessen. Den 
öppenhet som genomsyrar hela upphandlingsprocessen är den faktor som 
har störst påverkan och p.g.a. detta är anbudskarteller generellt väldigt 
stabila och de eftergiftsprogram som finns tillämpliga når inte sin fulla 
potential. Till följd av detta har de upphandlande myndigheterna en 
avgörande roll i det förebyggande och upptäckande arbetet av 
anbudskarteller. OECD har publicerat riktlinjer för att underlätta sådant 
arbete. Det ifrågasätts däremot om sådana riktlinjer är tillräckliga för att 
motverka anbudskarteller eller om det krävs lagstiftande verktyg.  
 
Trots vetskapen om att det är oerhört viktigt att motverka konkurrens- 
begränsande samarbeten är det inte många ändringar i det nya direktivet 
som pekar på detta och har det som sitt primära mål. Däremot har en del av 
de ändringar som gjorts potential att öppna upp marknaden för små och 
medelstora företag och även sänka inträdesbarriärerna. Detta kan resultera i 
fler anbudsgivare och en mer effektiv konkurrens. Konsekvensen av det är 
att anbudsgivarnas möjlighet att skapa och upprätthålla anbudskarteller 
minskar. Beroende på hur det nya direktivet implementeras i 
medlemsstaterna kommer det att påverka den effektiva konkurrensen i olika 
stor utsträckning. En av de slutsatser som görs är att lagstiftaren kunden ha 
gått längre i ett försök att skapa ett mer konkurrensfrämjande direktiv om 
offentlig upphandling.  
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Abbreviations 
Commission  European Commission 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ESPD  European Single Procurement Document 
EU  European Union 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
NCA National Competition Authority 
OECD   Organization for Economic and Co-operation 
and Development 
OJ  Official Journal of the European Union 
SCA  Swedish Competition Authority 
SME  Small and medium-sized enterprise 
TEU  Treaty of the European Union 
TFEU  Treaty of the functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Within the European Union the total expenditure on the public procurement 
of good and services is constantly increasing. A recently measured figure is 
that the public authorities spend around 18 per cent of GDP on procuring 
works, goods and services. Consequently, public procurement rules play an 
important role in the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth.1 In the Europe 2020 strategy the Commission emphasis 
that the public procurement policy must ensure the most efficient use of 
public funds and procurement markets must be kept EU wide.2 Thus, the 
Commission issued a Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public 
procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement 
Market in 2011.3 The Green Paper mentions critic that are raised against the 
current regime and emphasis that there is a need for a simplified legislation 
and to make the award of contracts more flexible. The Commission are clear 
about that there is a need to increase the system’s efficiency and 
effectiveness.4 One part of the efficiency is to generate best value for money 
and to be able to achieve that objective the Green Paper states that, 
 
“[…] it is vital to generate the strongest possible competition [my 
emphasis] for public contracts awarded in the internal market. Bidders 
must be given the opportunity to compete on a level-playing field and 
distortion of competition must be avoided [my emphasis].”5 
 
Getting value for money is an important objective, and maybe the most 
important for most national regimes on public procurement.6 The public 
procurement process is intended to promote fairness and to make sure that 
the contracting authorities reaches a price as low as possible. The lack of 
effective competition and competition violation amongst the tenderers is one 
of the things that counteract the aim to achieve best value for money. The 
public procurement rules do not expressly address the issue of violations of 
competition law, even though the violation is far from marginal.7 Since 
procurement facilitate anti competitive behaviour the need to increase 
attention on competition violation is crucial to achieve efficient spending of 
public funds.8 Competition is a fundamental principle that must be protected 
                                                
1 Commission, Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy 
2 Commission, Europe 2020 - A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM 
(2010) 2020 final, p 26. 
3 Hereafter referred to as the Green Paper. 
4 Green Paper, p 3. 
5 Green Paper, p 4. 
6 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 59. 
7 Green Paper, p 32. 
8 Ølykke, Grith, “How should the Relation between Public Procurement Law and 
Competition Law Be Addressed in the new Directive”, Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø (eds), 
EU Procurement Directives - modernisation, growth & innovation 2012, p 59. 
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and furthered to the maximum possible extent within the field of public 
procurement.9 Most competition violations in relation to public procurement 
involve bid rigging (cartels) by tenderers.10 Hardcore cartels are one of the 
most serious breaches of competition law and it is described as being the 
supreme evil of antitrust. Given this it is apparent that one of the most 
important objectives of competition law is to prevent and detect the 
operation of such cartels.11 To get the best value for money in public 
procurement it is pivotal that competition violation amongst the tenderers is 
prevented and detected. 
 
It has not been long ago since the current regime was introduced. The 
current regime consists of two directives, the Utilities Directive 
2004/17/EC12 and the Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC.13  Interesting to 
note is that the criticism that was raised prior to the current Directive is 
repeated in the criticism raised in the Green Paper. The 2004 consolidation 
has not been seen as wholly successful and the reform is therefore very 
welcomed.14 Followed by the Green Paper the Commission published a 
proposal for a Directive.15 After compromises the new Directives on public 
procurement were published in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJ) on March 28th. There are both new provisions introduced and a lot of 
changes made in the new Directives. Thus, some of the changes are going to 
be described and analysed in order to reach my purpose and answer my 
research question. 
1.2 Purpose and research question  
The purpose with the thesis is to determine how the new Public Sector 
Directive 2014/24/EU and the changes introduced therein are capable of 
affecting competition on the public market, both in general but also through 
the fighting of competition violation amongst the tenderers. Consequently, 
my research questions are as followed, 
 
- How is the new Directive on public procurement capable of creating 
effective competition on the public market?  
 
- How can the changes introduced affect the tenderers’ possibility to create 
and sustain a collusive agreement? 
                                                
9 Sánchez Graells, Albert, Public procurement and the EU competition rules 2011, p 12. 
10 Sánchez Graells, Albert, Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the 
New EU Directive on Public Procurement 2014, p 4., Available at, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2053414 
11 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 667. 
12 Directive 2004/17/EC for coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. 
13 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, hereafter referred to as the 
current Directive. 
14 Boyle, Rosemary, EU procurement green paper on the modernisation of EU public 
procurement policy: a personal response, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 171-174. 
15 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on 
public procurement COM(2011) 896 final, hereafter referred to in the text as the Proposal. 
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1.3 Method and Material 
The thesis is based on traditional legal method, which provides for a 
reconstruction of the legal system and applicable law.16 The main task of the 
legal dogmatic is to interpret and systemize applicable law.17 In order to 
reach the purpose of the thesis and answer the research question the thesis 
describes and analyses the recent development within the public 
procurement regime. The thesis also provides some elements of comparison 
between public procurement and competition law.  
 
First of all, I am going to make use of EU primary law, the founding treaties 
in the Lisbon Treaty, TEU and TFEU. In connection to this I am going to 
take the fundamental principles of EU law into consideration. These are 
binding sources of law and the fundamental principles, as discussed in 
chapter 2.1.2, are used by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to interpret 
EU law. Secondly, I am going to make use of secondary law and since the 
public procurement regime is mainly based on directives there will be great 
emphasis on this source of law.  
 
I will also put a lot of weight into guiding statements, such as guidelines 
from OECD, the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) and opinions from 
Advocate General. Communications, Green Papers, Working Documents 
and Notices from the Commission are also going to constitute part of the 
guidance. However it is important to note that these sources only constitutes 
guidance since they are soft law, which means that they are not binding 
upon the Member States. Further on, case law is an important factor in the 
interpretation of the treaties and the directives.18 The case law is mainly 
going to consist of EU case law. However, I will make use of national case 
law where it is appropriate to cover the national dimension and where there 
is absence of relevant EU case law. I will also make carefully selected 
references to relevant doctrine and analysis in the field.  
1.4 Demarcation 
The reader of the thesis is expected to have basic knowledge in public 
procurement law and the different stages in the procurement process. The 
basics in public procurement will therefore be excluded with the intention to 
accommodate for a more thorough analysis of the relevant changes and 
development made in the new Directive. The new public procurement 
regime consists of three Directives. However, the thesis will only cover the 
Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU. Situation falling above the threshold 
and within the scope of the directive is going to be covered. 
 
                                                
16 Jareborg, Nils, Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, p 4. Available at, http://svjt.se/svjt/2004/1 . 
17 Peczenik, Aleksander, Juridikens teori och metod: en introduktion till allmän rättslära 
1995 p 33. 
18 Hettne, Jörgen, EU-rättslig metod: teori och genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning 2011, p 
40.  
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There are two sides of a public procurement transaction and anti competitive 
behaviour can occur on both sides of this transaction. However, the thesis is 
only going to cover restraint of competition created by the tenderers and not 
by the procurers. Through the thesis I am going to presume that the 
collaborative behaviour is anti competitive and not further develop situation 
where information exchange, collaboration and joint bidding are permitted.  
 
The thesis accounts for a description of procedural changes in relation to 
exclusion of companies in the Directive on public procurement. However, 
other procedural changes such as the introduction of Innovation Partnership 
and Competitive procedure with negotiation will be disregarded due to 
limitations on space and that the changes that are covered are more related 
to the research question. Further, there will be a demarcation in relation to 
the objectives with the new directive. The second objective with the new 
directive is to allow procurers to make better use of public procurement is 
support of common social and environmental goals. This will not be 
accounted for in this thesis since it is improbable that it has a direct effect on 
the problems raised.  
 
Even if collusive agreements (bid rigging) mainly occurs on a national level 
the thesis will provide for an examination on Article 101 since it has direct 
effect on the Member States and the corresponding provisions is often to be 
found in the Member States national legislation. The problem with 
corruption is clearly linked to the risk of collusion, however this is going to 
be left out for further examination due to the space given.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
The thesis consists of 6 chapters. This first chapter is an introduction to the 
thesis where the purpose and research question is stated. The chapter also 
describes the method and material that is used through the thesis. 
 
The second chapter is an examination on the regulatory framework that the 
public procurement regime is based on. The fundamental principles deriving 
from the Directive on public procurement and its interaction with 
competition law are established.   
 
The third chapter is an examination of anti competitive behaviour, such as 
cartels and bid rigging, which is caught under Article 101 TFEU. The 
constituent element of the article, the notion of effective competition and the 
potential of leniency programmes are elaborated. The chapter also contains 
two examples from case law.  
 
The fourth chapter is a more thorough description of the specific 
circumstances of bid rigging. The risk factors for why public procurement is 
a danger zone for collusion and what measures that can be used in order to 
prevent and detect bid rigging are examined.  
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The fifth chapter focuses on the new Directive on public procurement. The 
focus is on the provisions that are likely to create effective competition on 
the public market and the fighting of anti competitive behaviour. The 
changes are described one by one and each change is followed by a section 
of reflections, both from doctrine and by me.   
 
The sixth and final chapter is a final and overall analysis and it accounts for 
the concluding remarks and reconnects to the introductory research 
questions. The chapter start with a summary of the previous mentioned 
legislative changes and reflections and then continues with some overall 
remarks and conclusions.  
 
Finally the thesis is complemented with a correlation table, which is meant 
to simplify for the reader when overviewing the different articles and 
changes.  
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2 Public Procurement Regime 
2.1 The regulatory framework 
2.1.1 Primary law 
The European Union has its foundation in the Lisbon Treaty, consisting of 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the Treaty of the functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) and its belonging Protocols. TEU, covers the 
basic provisions on the Union’s values and objectives. TFEU is a more 
detailed normalization of EU policies.19 The rules in the treaties have direct 
effect and they are the highest in the hierarchy on norms. The rules on free 
movement are to be found in the TFEU, consisting of inter alia the free 
movement of goods (Art 34), freedom of establishment (Art 49) and the 
freedom to provide services (Art 56). The public procurement rules are in an 
expression of the fundamental principles of free movement. It is clearly 
stated in the Directive on public procurement that the Member States and 
their authorities have to comply with the principles of TFEU and the 
fundamental principles deriving therefrom.20  
2.1.2 Fundamental principles 
The fundamental principles of law deriving from TFEU permeate the entire 
EU law and they are used to apply and interpret both primary and secondary 
law.21 The fundamental principles consist of equal treatment, non-
discrimination, transparency, proportionality and mutual recognition. 
 
The principle of non-discrimination derives from Article 18 TFEU, and 
implies that any discrimination based on nationality shall be prohibited. In 
Beentjes22 the ECJ stated that requirements in a procurement procedure 
which only tenderers in the same Member State are able to fulfil are 
considered incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination.23 The 
principle of equal treatment “requires that comparable situations must not 
be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the 
same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”.24 In the field of 
public procurement the two principles are clearly linked and the principle of 
non-discrimination based on nationality provides a specific expression of 
the principle of equal treatment.25 
                                                
19 Bernitz, Ulf, Finna rätt: juristens källmaterial och arbetsmetoder 2010, p 61. 
20 Directive 2004/18/EC, Recital 2, See also Directive 2014/24/EU, Recital 1.  
21 Sundstrand, Andrea, Offentlig upphandling: primärrättens reglering av offentliga 
kontrakt 2012, p 42. 
22 Case C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR I-4635. 
23 Case C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR I-4635, para 30., Cited in Sundstrand, Andrea, 
Offentlig upphandling: primärrättens reglering av offentliga kontrakt 2012, p 45. 
24 Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03 Fabricom [2005] ECR I-1559, para 27. 
25 Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-08585, para 48., Sundstrand, Andrea, 
Offentlig upphandling: primärrättens reglering av offentliga kontrakt 2012, p 45. 
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The principle of transparency implies that the contracting authorities have 
to ensure, “for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising 
sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and 
the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed”.26 The principle 
of transparency is linked to the principle of non-discrimination and argued 
to be a mechanism to ensure other fundamental principles rather than being 
an objective in itself.27 The principle of transparency also makes it possible 
to verify and ensure that the contracting authorities comply with the 
principle of equal treatment.28  
 
Article 2 in the current Directive on public procurement states that 
contracting authorities shall treat economic operators with respect to the 
principle of non-discrimination, transparency and equal treatment. The 
contracting authorities have to respect the principle of non-discrimination, 
the principle of equal treatment and the principle of transparency in all steps 
of the procurement process.29 
 
The principle of proportionality means that national measures must be 
suitable to secure the attainment of the objective which they pursue and they 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.30 In the field of 
public procurement the principles means that the contracting authorities are 
not allowed to set up stricter requirements than necessary. Requirements 
should be proportionate and linked to the subject matter of the contract.31  
 
Finally, the principle of mutual recognition emerged from the case Cassis 
de Dijon32 and is intended to avoid dual burden for the supplier of goods or 
services. The basics with the principle are that the goods and services that 
are lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State must be 
recognized and sold in another Member State without further restrictions.33 
In regard to public procurement it is relevant since the principle covers all 
aspects of trade within the internal market and it also entails a requirement 
of mutual recognition for e.g. certificates.34 
                                                
26 Case C-324/98 Telaustria [2000] ECR I-10745, para 62., Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau 
and others [2002] ECR I-11617, para 92. 
27 Case C-250/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-4369, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 
10. 
28 Case C-324/98 Telaustria, para 61., Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] 
ECR I-8291, para 31., For further explanation on the principle of transparency see chapter 
4.1.2. 
29 Case C-16/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-8315 para 107., Case C-87/94 
Commission v Belgium, Wallonska Busses [1996] ECR I-2043, para 54. 
30 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37., Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR 
I-1459, para 34. 
31 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland [2002] ECR I-7213, para 69. 
32 Case C-120/78 Rewe Zentral AG [1979] ECR 649. 
33 Barnard, Catherine, The substantive law of the EU: the four freedoms 2013, p 93. 
34 Sundstrand, Andrea, Offentlig upphandling: primärrättens reglering av offentliga 
kontrakt 2012, p 47. 
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2.1.3 Secondary law 
The rules on public procurement are mainly based on secondary law, in 
forms of directives. A directive is binding upon the Member States but the 
national authorities have the discretion to choose the form and method for 
implementation as long as the result is achieved.35 Unlike the treaty rules, 
which has direct effect, the directives has to be implemented by the Member 
States in the national legislation in order to be invoked by a national court. 
The Directive on public procurement is a minimum requirement Directive, 
which means that the Member States are free to implement stricter rules for 
the contracting authorities. However, in some parts of it the rules are so 
detailed that it results in full harmonisation and no discretion for the 
Member States to derogate from the provisions.36  
2.2 The interaction with competition law 
The Directive on public procurement is in essence an expression on the rules 
on free movement that are to be found in TFEU. What are also to be found 
in TFEU are the rules on competition. Article 101 TFEU prohibits 
agreements between undertakings that have as their object or effect to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the internal market.37 The 
contracting authorities are not considered to be undertakings and therefore 
the competition rules do not apply to them.38 However, this does not imply 
that the competition law is not important in a public procurement context 
since the competition law regulates the behaviour of the tenderers.39 The 
rules on procurement regulate the behaviour of the purchaser and the 
competition rules regulate the behaviour of the supplier. 
 
Since the rules regulated to sides of the same transaction there should not be 
any conflict or overlap between the two sets of rules and therefore it is vital 
to reach coherence. Reaching coherence of the outcomes of the rules is 
important to be able to reach effective competition between the tenderers in 
the procedure.40 To reach effective competition, and also prevent collusion 
amongst them is one of the challenges to ensure the effective functioning of 
public procurement and thereby maximizing value for money.41 The 
                                                
35 Article 288 TFEU., Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, EU law: text, cases, and materials 
2011, p 192. 
36 Sundstrand, Andrea, Offentlig upphandling: primärrättens reglering av offentliga 
kontrakt 2012, p 93. 
37 For further discussion on Article 101 TFEU see chapter 3.1 and 3.2. 
38 Case C‑205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I‑6295, para 26., Case C-113/07 P 
Selex Sistemi SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207, para 102., Referred to in Ølykke, 
Grith, How does the Court of Justice of the European Union Pursue Competition Concerns 
in a Public Procurement Context?, P.P.L.R. 2011, No 6, p 180-181. 
39 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 179. 
40 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181. 
41 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, Competition policy and international trade 
liberalisation: essential complements to ensure good performance in public procurement 
markets, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 68. 
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elimination of unnecessary barriers to trade that impede competition is 
another such challenge.42 
 
The need for coherence becomes even more apparent when looking at the 
objectives with the two regulatory systems. Competition law is an important 
part in the foundation of the EU and the regulatory framework. The 
importance of creating an internal market is established in TEU.43 Therefore 
one of the objectives with competition law is to facilitate the creation of an 
internal market.44 One important part in that is preventing undertakings from 
creating barriers to free movement.45 To enhance efficiency, maximizing 
consumer welfare and to protect smaller firms and consumers is also parts 
of the objectives pursued by the competition rules.46  
 
The objectives with public procurement rules are to break done barriers to 
trade in the public market to achieve the establishment of an internal 
market.47 It is held by ECJ that the purpose with coordinating the award of 
public contracts is to eliminate barriers to free movement and protect the 
interest of traders wanting to offer goods across borders.48  Further, it is 
stated in Assitur49 that the procurement rules, 
 
“were adopted in pursuance of the establishment of the internal market, in 
which freedom of movement is ensured and restrictions on competition are 
eliminated”50 
 
In Assitur the pursuance of competition concerns was clearly recognised by 
the ECJ.51 The ECJ held that it is vital to ensure the widest possible 
participation by tenderers and the highest possible number of potential 
tenderers.52 
To sum up, both the public procurement regime and the competition rules 
are tools to ensure that the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition is upheld, as referred to in Article 119 TFEU.53 The two sets of 
rules are dependent on each other to create an internal market.  Ølykke 
explains it as public procurement and competition law shares a “higher” 
objective of European integration, but also “lower” objectives such the 
prevention of protectionism and barriers to free movement and the creation 
                                                
42 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 68. 
43 Article 3 TEU. 
44 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, EU law: text, cases, and materials 2011, p 959-960. 
45 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181. 
46 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, EU law: text, cases, and materials 2011, p 959-960. 
47 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 44. 
48 Case C-380/98 University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035, para 16., Case C-19/00 
SIAC Construction [2001] ECR I-7725, para 32., Case C -507/03, Commission vs. Ireland 
[2007] ECR I-9777, para 27. 
49 Case C-538/07 Assitur [2009] ECR I-4219. 
50 Case C-538/07 Assitur [2009] ECR I-4219, para 25., Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy 
[2008] ECR I-619, para 2., Cited in Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R 2011, p 188. 
51 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 188. 
52 Case C-538/07 Assitur [2009] ECR I-4219, para 26., Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R 2011, p 191. 
53 Sánchez Graells, Albert, Public procurement and the EU competition rules 2011, p 3. 
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of effective competition.54 Munro explains the objectives to be two sides of 
the same coin.55 
As stated, recent cases from the ECJ have shown that they are willing to 
pursue competition concerns in a public procurement context. However, 
public procurement law has been relatively disconnected from competition 
law.56 Even if they are linked their relationship are rarely assessed. One 
reason for that can be that the two systems are enforced through strictly 
separate systems.57 The enforcement of public procurement law is regulated 
through the Remedies Directive,58 and the rules on competition are enforced 
through Regulation 1/2003.59 The fact that the rules are enforced through 
two different systems makes the achievement of coherence much more 
difficult.60 Also, the public procurement rules are procedural rules whilst the 
competition law regulates the behaviour of the undertakings on the market, 
regardless of the existing circumstances.61 
 
Ølykke however emphasis that even if the competition law has been 
relatively disconnected from the public procurement rules there might be a 
legislative solution on its way, considering that the Commission has opened 
the debate in their Green Paper.62 For the first time ever in a public 
procurement policy document the prevention of anti competitive behaviour 
is addressed.63 The Commission raises the fact that even if the public 
procurement rules do not specifically address the issue of competition law 
violation there is much guidance. Further, they question if the guidance is 
sufficient to fight collusive behaviour or if there is a need for specific 
legislative instruments.64  
 
                                                
54 Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle [2005] ECR I-0001, para 44., Referred to in Ølykke, Grith, 
P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181-182. 
55 Munro, Catriona, Competition law and public procurement: two sides of the same coin? 
P.P.L.R. 2006, 6, p 352-361.  
56 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 180. 
57 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 183.  
58 Directive 2007/66 amending Council Directives 89/665 and 92/13 with regard to 
improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts. 
59 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
60 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 183. 
61 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181. 
62 Ølykke, Grith, P.P.L.R. 2011, fn 12, p 180., Green Paper, paras. 3.2 and 3.3 at p 30 – 33. 
63 Ølykke, Grith, “How should the Relation between Public Procurement Law and 
Competition Law Be Addressed in the new Directive”, Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø (eds), 
EU Procurement Directives - modernisation, growth & innovation 2012, p 57. 
64 Green Paper, p 32. 
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3 Antitrust violation 
3.1 Cartels and bid rigging 
Competition law applies to the tenderers in the public procurement 
procedure. In order to ensure effective competition on the internal market all 
economic operators shall act independently.65 Article 101 TFEU is therefore 
an essential provision under the rules on competition. 
 
“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market […]”66 
 
Article 101(1) are listing practices that are of special concern, such as 
directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices and share markets. 
The prohibition includes collusive behaviour between undertakings such as 
the creation and operation of cartels for example.67 A cartel is a type of 
horizontal agreement and the Commission defines a cartel as “a group of 
similar, independent companies which join together to fix prices, to limit 
production or to share markets or customers between them.”68 Hardcore 
cartels are one of the most serious breaches of competition law and it is 
described as being the supreme evil of antitrust.69 When collusion occurs in 
public procurement they are referred to as collusive tendering or bid rigging.  
 
“Bid rigging, or collusive tendering occurs when businesses, that would 
otherwise be expected to compete, secretly conspire to raise prices or lower 
the quality of goods or services for purchasers who wish to acquire 
products or services through a bidding process”70 
 
Bid rigging is automatically an infringement of Article 101(1).71 It is stated 
in The European Sugar Cartel72 that competition is of essence in a system 
of tendering. If the tenders submitted are not the result of individual 
economic calculation by each and every tenderer but with coordination 
between them competition is prevented or at least distorted and restricted.73 
 
                                                
65 Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, para 116. 
66 Article 101(1) TFEU. 
67 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 798. 
68 European Commission, Overview Competition Cartels, Available at, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html 
69 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 667. 
70 OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 1., Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf 
71 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 689. 
72 The European Sugar Cartel [1973] OJ L140/07. 
73 The European Sugar Cartel [1973] OJ L140/07, para 42., Jones, Alison, EU Competition 
Law 2014, p 689. 
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Bid rigging schemes can be executed in different forms, either through price 
fixing or market allocation. The most common forms of bid rigging schemes 
are listed below,  
 
Cover bidding; is used to give appearance of genuine competition. 
Either the competitors agree that one of them are going to submit a 
bid higher than the other, or that one of them are going to submit that 
is known to be too high. Another alternative is that one of them 
submits a bid with special terms, which they know are unacceptable.  
 
Bid rotation; is often combined with cover bidding. The 
competitors agree on that they are going to rotate on which one of 
them that are going to submit the winning tender.  
 
Market allocation; occurs when the competitors carve up the 
market and agrees not to bid (or cover bid) on each other’s markets. 
This can be done both for certain customers and for certain 
geographic areas.  
 
Bid suppression; implies that either one of the competitors refrain 
from bidding or both submit a bid but then one of them withdraws 
their submitted bid.74 
 
Subcontracting; can be used as a compensating mechanism in a bid 
rigging scheme. When competitors agree not to bid or when they 
submit a cover bid they do it in exchange of a subcontract with the 
winning tenderer in whereas they divide the profits derived from the 
illegally obtained higher price. It is however important to note that 
subcontracting is not always anti competitive and prohibited.75 
 
The common factor of the different forms of bid rigging is that it is an 
agreement between all or some of the bidders that result in elimination or 
limitation of competition and it also predetermines who to be awarded the 
contract.76 Bid rigging can occur both through explicit and implicit 
agreements.77  
 
 
 
                                                
74 OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 2. 
75 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 80. 
76 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 79. 
77 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo, Zanza., “Division into lots and competition in procurement” in 
Dimitri, Piga, Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of procurement 2006, p 181. 
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3.2 Case law 
3.2.1 Pre Insulated Pipe Cartel 
The Pre Insulated Pipe Cartel established in Denmark between four Danish 
producers of pre insulated pipes and ABB was one of the suppliers. A few 
years later the cartel extended to Italy and Germany. The cartel consisted of 
10 producers in total and the characteristics of the infringement consisted 
mainly in price fixing, fixing of quotas and market sharing. The conduct 
affected the whole EU. The companies were also convicted for allocating 
individual projects to selected producers and manipulating the bidding 
procedure for those projects in order to ensure that the assigned producer 
was awarded the contract in question. To be able to protect the cartel from 
competition from the only non-member of the cartel, Powerpipe, they also 
took measures to hinder their commercial activity and damage their business 
and drive it out of the market. The Commission started an investigation after 
a complaint from Powerpipe. In 1999 the Commission issued a decision 
against the 10 producers and imposed record fines for European-wide bid 
rigging. The fine was set at 70 million euro to ABB, however the ECJ 
reduced it to 65 million euro after appeal.78 
3.2.2 The Swedish Asphalt Cartel 
The Swedish Asphalt Cartel is the greatest cartels of all times in Sweden. In 
2009 the Swedish Market Court delivered its judgement against Swedish 
companies within the production and sales of asphalt. NCC, Skanska, Peab 
and the Swedish Road Administration was the main suppliers convicted for 
the cartel and the cartel consisted in both price fixing and market allocation, 
both on the private and on the public market. The cartel consisted in bid 
rigging in regard to production, sales and construction works.  
 
The cartel was discovered due to the fact that earlier employees of NCC 
informed the SCA about the on going cartel. Remarkable, the Swedish Road 
Administration that is state owned was part of the cartel and in the 
procurement they were both a procuring authority and a supplier of asphalt 
and the construction work. The cartel resulted in high prices for the 
contracting authorities and the exposure of the cartel resulted in a price drop 
between 25-30 per cent.  
 
Except for the fact that the Swedish competition rules were applicable the 
Swedish Market Court also assessed that the trade criteria was satisfied and 
therefore Article 101 TFEU also applied. At the time the case was decided it 
reached the highest fines ever imposed and NCC was fined 200 million 
SEK.79 
                                                
78 Pre Insulated Pipe Cartel, (No IV/35.691/E.4), [1999], OJ L 24., Case T-31/99 ABB Asea 
Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission  [2002] ECR II-01881. 
79 Judgement from the Swedish Market Court, MD 2009:11. 
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3.3 Constituent elements of Article 101 TFEU 
In order for a conduct to be caught under Article 101 TFEU there are a few 
constituent elements that has to be fulfilled. First of all the there has to exist 
an agreement, decision or a concerted practice between undertakings. 
Secondly, the conduct must be considered to have as its object or effect to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition. Finally, the conduct must be 
considered to affect trade between Member States.80  
 
There is now definition of undertakings in TFEU, however it has been 
defined in the case law from the ECJ. Undertakings are any entity engaged 
in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way 
in which it is financed.81 Any activity consisting in offering goods and 
services on a given market is an economic activity.82 The activity of giving 
tender in a public procurement involves an offer of services or goods to the 
contracting authority.  
 
The notion of agreement is interpreted widely under Article 101. Both 
formal agreements and more informal agreements, “gentlemen’s 
agreements” is caught under Article 101.83 In other words it covers both 
written and oral agreements between two undertakings.84 The concept of 
concerted practice is intended to cover collusion between undertakings 
without them having reached the state where a properly agreement has been 
concluded.85 Article 101 is supposed to apply to all types of collusion 
regardless of what form it takes.86 Since bid rigging can take forms in both 
explicit agreements and tacit collusion it is vital that the prohibition covers 
both. In complex infringements, such as cartels and bid rigging, the 
Commission or the party having the burden of proof does not have to show 
explicitly whether there has been an agreement or a concerted practice.87 
 
The conduct must also have as its object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition. It is appropriate to first consider the object of 
the agreement before considering its effects.88 Once it appears that the 
agreement has as its object to restrict competition it is not necessary to 
consider its effects.89 If an agreement is indisputably intended to restrict 
competition, for example thorough price fixing or allocation it is 
unnecessary to show that the competition has in fact been effected. Hardcore 
restrictions such as cartels are therefore often referred to as being per se 
                                                
80 Bellamy & Child, European community law of competition 2008, p 92. 
81 Case C-41/90 Höfner & Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21. 
82 Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, para 36. 
83 Case C-41/69, 44 and 45 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission [1970] ECR 661. 
84 Lidgaard, Hans Henrik, Competition classics 2011, p 56.  
85 Case C-48/69 ICI v Commission Dyestuffs [1972] ECR 619. 
86 Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, para 108. 
87 Bellamy & Child, European community law of competition 2008, p 120., More about the 
burden of proof in chapter 4.2.2. 
88 Bellamy & Child, European community law of competition 2008, p 162. 
89 Case C-56/64 and 58 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1996] ECR 299 at 242. 
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infringements of Article 101 TFEU.90 With background from the reasoning 
in the European Sugar Cartel were they stated that competition is of 
essence in a system of tendering and if tenders are submitted on the basis of 
coordination competition is prevented or at least distorted and restricted it 
can be concluded that bid rigging is a restriction of competition by object.91  
 
Finally Article 101 only applies to agreements, which may affect trade 
between Member States. The effect does not have to be direct or actual. 
Indirect and potential effect also falls under the notion of “may affect trade 
between Member States”. In Vereeniging van Cementhandeleren92 the ECJ 
has held that even if a cartel is of domestic nature it can still affect trade 
between Member States since it has a foreclosure effect on foreign 
competitors.93 Even if bid rigging in public procurement markets often are 
of domestic nature they are likely to be caught under Article 101 TFEU. If 
they are not they are probably going to be caught under respective national 
legislation. In Sweden for example, anti competitive behaviour is caught by 
the Swedish Competition Act (Konkurrenslagen) 2:1.94  
 
The notion of may affect trade between Member States also requires an 
element of appreciability. An agreement is not caught under Article 101 if it 
only has an insignificant effect on the market.95 This concept is further 
explained in a Notice from the Commission, de minimis.96 The exemption 
also applies to hardcore violations. This means that it is possible that bid 
rigging does not fall under Article 101. A case-by-case analysis is of 
essence.97 
3.4 Effective competition 
The achievement of effective competition is important for many purposes in 
the public procurement market and consequently there are several reasons to 
fight collusive agreements. One of the primary, and most well known 
reasons is the fact that competition generates lower prices and improves the 
quality of products and services.98 Collusive agreements and the lack of 
effective competition can however also have other desirable effects such as 
reducing incentives to innovate99, damage the variety on the market100 and 
eliminate pressure to achieve cost efficiencies. Consequently, cartels destroy 
                                                
90 Bellamy & Child, European community law of competition 2008, p 163. 
91 For further explanation on the European Sugar Cartel see chapter 3.1.  
92 Case C-8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandeleren [1972] ECR 977. 
93 Lidgaard, Hans Henrik, Competition classics 2011, p 105. 
94 Konkurrenslag (2008:579) 2:1. 
95 Case C-5/69 Völk v Sprl Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, 5/7. 
96 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) EC Treaty (de minimis). 
97 Weishaar, Stefan E., Cartels, competition and public procurement: law and economics 
approaches to bid rigging 2013, p 72. 
98 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 70. 
99 Heimler, Alberto, Cartels in Public Procurement, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 2012, p 2. 
100 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 659. 
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competition that causes serious harm both on economies and on consumer 
welfare.101 In a public procurement context it is going to affect the public 
purchasers possibility to spend public funds efficiently and get the best 
value for money. It is important to deter competitors to participate in such 
collusive behaviour since bid rigging is known to raise prices more than 
ordinary price fixing.102 In general, collusive behaviour amongst tenderers 
has shown to raise prices with 20 per cent above competition level.103 An 
example is the exposure of the Swedish Asphalt Cartel that resulted in a 
price drop between 25 – 30 per cent.104  
 
The expression of effective competition is used both in the legal doctrine but 
also in the legal framework and case law. There are many apparently 
reasonable definitions of effective competition. One definition is effective 
competition as the process of rivalry.105 Another alternative definition is that 
there is considered to be effective competition when there is an absence of 
restraints on a firm’s economic activity by another firm. The Commission 
usually applies this definition when they decide if an agreement is an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU.106  
 
Even if an agreement is considered prohibited under Article 101(1) there is a 
possibility that it can be exempted under Article 101(3) if it contributes to 
improvement of production or distribution of goods, promotion of technical 
or economical progress and at the same time allowing consumers a fair 
share of the benefits resulting from it. Cartels are however described as 
being “naked”. It means that they are neither producing efficiencies nor 
benefits.107 Compared to other restrictive agreements they restrict 
competition without producing any countervailing benefits. In cases where 
there are such benefits the negative and positive effects need to be balanced 
against each other but with cartels there are no such benefits to balance 
against.108 Cartels, which are considered to be hardcore activity are therefore 
incapable of satisfying the conditions to be exempted under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.109 
 
 
                                                
101 Monti, Mario, ”Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive behaviour?” 
Fighting cartels, why and how?” in Swedish Competition Authority (ed), Fighting cartels – 
why and how? 2001, p 14. 
102 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 689. 
103 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 71. 
104 Albano, Buccirossi, Spagnolo, Zanza, “Preventing collusion in procurement”, in Dimitri, 
Piga, Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of procurement 2006, p 348., For further explanation on 
the Swedish Asphalt Cartel see chapter 3.5.2. 
105 Bishop, Simon, Walker, Mike, Economics of E.C. Competition Law: concepts, 
application and measurement 2000, p 13. 
106 Bishop, Simon, Walker, Mike, Economics of E.C. Competition Law: concepts, 
application and measurement 2000, p 15. 
107 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 691. 
108 Monti, Mario, ”Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive behaviour?” 
Fighting cartels, why and how?” in Swedish Competition Authority (ed), Fighting cartels – 
why and how? 2001, p 15. 
109 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 691. 
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3.5 Leniency programme 
One important tool for the detection and deterrence of cartels is to 
encourage member of a cartel to come forward with their unlawful 
behaviour. This is done through so called leniency programmes.110 The first 
firm who comes forward and reports a cartel to the Competition Authority 
can get full immunity but it can also provide for lenient treatment to the 
firms that decide to cooperate when the procedure is already started.111 The 
EU first adopted a leniency programme in 1996. Then it was amended both 
in 2002 and in 2006. The introduction of a leniency programme has been 
very successful in the detection of cartels in the private market. Cartels are 
in general very unstable and if it is likely that the cartel will break up there 
are also high incentives to ask for leniency.112 A cartel on the private market 
usually consists in raising prices and restricting output and it can be 
profitable to cheat on the cartel and start to sell below the agreed price or 
above the decided quantity. Provided that the other members respect the 
cartel agreement. This is normally referred to as the prisoners dilemma.113  
 
However, it does not seem like collusion in public procurement markets 
have been so much affected by leniency programs.114 The discovered cartels 
through leniency have been very few on the public procurement markets. 
First of all, a reason for this can be that the bid rigging mainly fall of 
domestic nature and seldom fall under EU law. However, Member States 
often have their own leniency programmes. Secondly, the stability of cartels 
in the public procurement markets is a deterrent factor for leniency. Cartels 
on the public market are more stable than on the private market and the 
incentives to cheat are very low due to inter alia the transparency on the 
market.115 Due to the fact that the cartels on the public market tend to be 
much more stable than on the private market there is a tendency that the 
cartels on the public markets have much more members. Discovered cartels 
in the construction industry have been constituted of around 100 
members.116 
 
Because of the low incentives to cheat and the stability in a bid rigging 
scheme on the public market the leniency programme does not reach its full 
potential in the public market and therefore the focus needs to be put 
somewhere else. Therefore the focus is more on the contracting authorities 
and their possibilities to actually prevent and detect bid rigging.117  
 
                                                
110 Kovacic, William E. and Anderson Robert D, P.P.L.R. 2009, p 83. 
111 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 9. 
112 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 10. 
113 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 6. 
114 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 3. 
115 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 10. 
116 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 3. 
117 The reasoning of why cartels on the public markets tend to be much more stable and 
why the focus has been put on the contracting authorities are further explained in chapter 4.  
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4 Bid rigging 
4.1 Risk factors 
Public procurement is a danger zone for collusive agreements.118 Especially 
exposed are the markets where the public buyer is the main or sole buyer of 
special goods or services. Such as roads or other public works, 
constructions, healthcare markets, education, environmental protection and 
defence markets.119 There are many different factors affecting the tenderers’ 
possibility to reach collusive agreements. These risk factors can be divided 
into two different categories. First of all, the issues related to the market 
structure and secondly, the different features of the public procurement 
process affecting the possibility to conclude these types of agreements. 
 
4.1.1 Market structure 
The public authorities are operating in various different markets and there 
are a few of them in which they have to take certain precautious on 
prevention and detection of collusive behaviour amongst the tenderers.120 
Some of the factors that are affecting this are the number of suppliers on the 
market, the type of product or service that is going to be purchased and the 
possibility for a new economic operator to enter the market.121  
 
The number of suppliers on the market can have a significant effect on the 
tenderers’ possibility to collude. The arranging of a bid rigging scheme is 
easier the less competitors there are on the market and therefore the risk of 
collusion is higher.122 Another aspect of the number of participants is the 
more competitors you have to agree with the less profit you will get since 
you will have to share it between several others.123 
 
The second factor having impact on whether the market is more susceptible 
to bid rigging is what type of product or service that are going to be 
purchased. If the product or service is standardized and simple it is easier to 
come to a collusive agreement and create and sustain a bid rigging scheme. 
                                                
118 Report from the Swedish Competition Authority, ”Osund konkurrens 
i offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel”, Report 2013:6, p 
138., Available at, http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/rapport_2013-
6.pdf  
119 Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the New EU Directive on 
Public Procurement 2014, p 5. 
120 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 7. Available at, 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42594504.pdf  
121 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 7. 
122 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 7. 
123 Weishaar, Stefan E., Cartels, competition and public procurement: law and economics 
approaches to bid rigging 2013, p 97. 
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If the product does not change over time the risk of bid rigging is higher.124 
Bid rigging schemes are going to be easier to create and sustain if there is a 
market with little or no degree of innovation or technological change in the 
product or service.125 
Thirdly, if there are high barriers to entry the risk of new competitors 
entering the market are low and the risk of collusive behaviour increases. If 
it is costly, difficult or time consuming to enter a market the already existing 
firms are protected against potential competition from new entrants. If the 
competitors know that they can follow through a bid rigging scheme without 
being interrupted by new entrants the probability that they collude is going 
to be higher. These barriers also make it easier for the already existing 
companies to know their competitors in advance and it supports bid rigging 
efforts.126 Public procurement rules are created to break down barriers to 
trade within the internal market but some certain circumstances creates such 
barriers anyways.127 
 
4.1.2 Procurement process 
The predictability, the transparency and the repeated nature of the process 
are other factors related to the procurement process that facilitate collusive 
tendering. 
 
The procurement process is in general very predictable since it is very easy 
for the economic operators to know in advance which economic operators 
who probably are interested in participating in the tender, due to the limited 
nature of a procurement situation. The unserious company that wants to 
reach an agreement with the competitors therefore knows whom to 
contact.128 It is also expected that competitors are more likely to come to a 
collusive agreement if they expect a higher number of repeated interactions 
in the future.129 The duration of the procured contracts can therefore have 
significant effect. Deviation from a bid rigging scheme would be more 
profitable if the duration of the contract are longer. The risk would also be 
minimized since the prolonged duration complicates the rotation of 
contracts between tenderers.130 Therefore, it would be preferable with longer 
length of the contract in a market where there is a high risk of collusion.131  
 
                                                
124 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 7. 
125 OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 3. 
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127 For further discussions on this see chapter 5. 
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130 Carpineti, Piga, Zanza, “The variety of procurement practice: evidence from public 
procurement”, in Dimitri, Piga, Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of procurement 2006, p 37. 
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As stated in chapter 2.1.1, the procurement process is permeated by the 
principle of transparency. Since the award of a public contracts concerns the 
spending of public funds it is important that the process are transparent and 
open to public scrutiny. The contracting authorities have to ensure that the 
degree of advertisement are sufficient enough to open up the market for 
competition and allow for objectively review of the procurement 
procedure.132 Hence, the principle of transparency needs to be followed both 
through the awarding of the contract but also during the selection phase. 
There is however no express definition of transparency from the ECJ but it 
is possible to deduce four important dimensions of it, which is publicity of 
contracts, publicity for the rules of the process, limits in discretion and 
provision for verification and enforcement.133 Even if early case law 
established the transparency principle as vital there was no was no express 
reference to the principle in the Directive on public procurement at that 
time.134 However the current Directive expressly states that when 
contracting authorities are awarding contracts they “shall treat economic 
operators equally and non-discriminatory and shall act in a transparent 
way.”135 These three principles are underlying for the interpretation and the 
application of the Directive.  
 
Arrowsmith describes the principle of transparency as two folded. 
Transparency is needed in order to prevent discrimination.136 It is also 
needed to insure that foreign competitors gives tenders on the public market 
but dangerous when it comes to giving out information to competitors since 
it gives them an opportunity to collude. Absence of transparency might 
deter foreign participation but it might also decrease collaboration between 
competitors.137 The principle implies that the competitors have full access to 
get information about the successful tenderer, both the characteristics of the 
tender such as price and the name of the tenderer.138 The transparency in the 
public market is therefore a factor that increases the risk for collusive 
behaviour. It is easy for the competitors to get information about any given 
tender after the contract has been awarded and therefore they can know 
whether or not the competitor stuck to the agreement or not.139 This is what 
is reflected in the stability of the cartels on the public market and the reason 
for why there are less incentives to cheat. That is also why the leniency 
programmes has not reached its full potential in the public market.140  
 
 
                                                
132 Case C-324/98 Telaustria [2000] ECR I-10745, para 62., Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau 
and others [2002] ECR I-11617, para 92. 
133 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 131. 
134 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 36. 
135 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 2. 
136 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 60. 
137 Arrowsmith, Sue, Eu Public Procurement Law - An Introduction 2010, p 51. 
138 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 41. 
139 Report from the Swedish Competition Authority, ”Osund konkurrens 
i offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, 2013:6”, p 138. 
140 Heimler, Alberto, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, p 6., See also 
chapter 3.4. 
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It is argued that the transparency requirement is a tool to ensure and 
supervise the competition on the internal market rather than being an 
objective in itself.141 It is shown through experiences that too much 
regulation on the transparency rules is as least as harmful as too little 
regulation. To avoid this it is important that the transparency rules focuses 
on the aspects that promotes competition rather than deters it.142 Ølykke 
emphasis that, due to the transparency and the repeated nature, it is vital that 
there is an increased attention on ensuring that the competition law is not 
violated to be able to achieve efficient spending of public funds.143 
 
To illustrate both the factors relating to the market structure and the public 
procurement process is here an example. One market where the risk for 
collusive tendering is high is the school milk market. The only dimension on 
competition is price, the demand is inelastic, different suppliers face similar 
production costs and it is a repeated nature of the purchase. 144 The 
predictability, the repeated nature of public procurement and the high level 
of transparency are complimentary negative for the risk of collusive 
behaviour.  
4.2 Fighting bid rigging 
As stated, leniency has not reached its full potential in the public 
procurement market and therefore the focus to fight bid rigging must be 
somewhere else. The closest party able to fight bid rigging is the contracting 
authority awarding the public contract. In 2009 OECD published guidelines 
on how to fight bid rigging. It contains in both guidelines on how to prevent 
bid rigging but also how to detect it when it already occurred. The design of 
the contract can play an important role in both prevention and detection of 
bid rigging. Contracting authorities therefore plays an extremely important 
role in this effort.145 The tendering procedure can result in a competitive 
outcome and efficient spending of taxpayer´s money if the procurers follow 
the guidelines from OECD.146  
4.2.1 Prevention and detection 
The first guidelines that OECD has given out gives guidance on how the 
contracting authorities should design their contracts in order to prevent bid 
rigging.147 In these guidelines they first of all they raises the fact that it is 
important to be aware of the types of markets that are more susceptible to 
                                                
141 Trepte, Peter, “Transparency Requirement” in Nielsen, Treumer (eds), The new EU 
Public Procurement Directives 2005, p 59.  
142 Boyle, Rosemary, P.P.L.R. 2011, p 181. 
143 Ølykke, Grith, “How should the Relation between Public Procurement Law and 
Competition Law Be Addressed in the new Directive”, Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø (eds), 
EU Procurement Directives - modernisation, growth & innovation 2012, p 59. 
144 Jones, Alison, EU Competition Law 2014, p 689. 
145 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, Citation by John Fingleton, p 2. 
146 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, Citation by Melanie L Aitken, p 4. 
147 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging. 
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bid rigging.148 They also highlight the importance of knowing the market 
well. Knowing the conditions in the specific market and for the specific 
product that the contracting authority is going to purchase helps them to 
design an effective process and recognising what is an acceptable price and 
what is not.149  
 
Further on, they stress the importance of encourage strong participation by 
tenderers, because the more tenderers the less risk of bid rigging. One of the 
reasons why an economic operator is not giving a tender is the high cost of 
preparing one. If the costs are lowered it will generate in more participation. 
OECD is proposing that this can be done by only require adequate 
information in their tender and by using electronic bidding systems if 
possible. 150 The benefit of having electronically bidding systems is also that 
it will limit communication between tenderers. Limited communication 
means fewer opportunities to come to an agreement amongst tenderers.151 If 
the communications among bidders are limited and if it is difficult for 
tenderers to identify their competitors it will be more complicated for them 
to arrange a bid rigging scheme, since it requires communication. OECD 
therefore recommends that contracting authorities should avoid bringing 
potential tenderers together in meetings, allow electronically bidding and 
keep the identity of bidders undisclosed by using number rather than 
names.152 The participation can also be reduced if the contracting authorities 
put up unnecessary restrictions on the tenderers size, composition or 
nature.153 
 
Furthermore they recommend having clear requirements and allowing for 
unpredictability in the tender process. Having clear requirements can 
encourage participation since the tenderers knows what is expected from 
them. Predictability is one of the things that facilitate for the tenderers to 
reach a collusive agreement, and by vary the scope of contracts by 
aggregating contracts and not there will be less predictability.154 OECD also 
recommends that the public purchaser should evaluate the criteria for 
awarding contract carefully and provide training to procurement staff about 
bid rigging.155  
 
Prevention is the first priority since detection is hard and even if the bid 
rigging is detected the damage has already occurred.156 However, an 
increased risk of being detected can have a deterrent effect on the 
competitors’ choice whether to create a collusive agreement or not. 
 
                                                
148 For further explanation see chapter 4.1.2. 
149 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 8. 
150 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 8. 
151 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 9. 
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153 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 8. 
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155 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 9-10. 
156 Report from the Swedish Competition Authority, ”Osund konkurrens 
i offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, 2013:6”, p 142. 
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Since bid rigging agreements is hardcore restrictions they are normally 
negotiated in secret and therefore they are extremely hard to detect. It is also 
extremely hard for a contracting authority to know when such behaviour 
exists and it can be difficult to know what to look for. Therefore OECD has 
given some guidelines on certain bidding patterns and practices indicating 
that bid rigging has occurred.157 There are also a few Member States that 
have come up with a checklist for the contracting authorities to follow to be 
more aware and able to detect bid rigging. Sweden is one of those Member 
States.158  
 
OECD recommends that you should look for opportunities that the tenderers 
have to communicate and indications that the tendered have communicated 
with each other.159 Contracting authorities should also look for suspicious 
bidding patterns, unusual behaviour and similarities in the document 
submitted by different bidders since the bid riggers often have one single 
person submitting all bids.160 Most importantly, look for any relationships 
among the bidders after the successful bid is announced. Such relationships 
can serve to split the extra profit that is earned through bid rigging. 
Subcontracts can be such a way to split profits for example.161 
 
4.2.2 Proving an infringement of Article 101 TFEU 
The contracting authorities play an important role in the prevention and 
detection of bid rigging. However, they do not have the burden of proving 
an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. If a contracting authority suspects 
that the tenderers in their procurement are collaborating and exert a bid 
rigging scheme they shall turn to the National Competition Authority 
(NCA) within their jurisdiction which is responsible for competition 
enforcement.162 It is very important that the NCAs have communication 
channels where the contracting authorities can discuss suspicious bid 
rigging and where they can report it.163 The SCA has a communication 
channel for the public purchasers for them to talk to someone if suspicious. 
There are many contracting authorities which do not report such suspicions 
because they often believes that they have to have full proof on the bid 
rigging before reporting it, which is not necessary.164 Important to note is 
also that there is nothing explicit in the current Directive saying that the 
contracting authorities are obliged to report a suspicious of competition 
violation or bid rigging to the NCA.  
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The Commission, the National Courts and the NCAs are all empowered to 
apply Article 101.165 When the contracting authority has reported the 
suspicious the responsible competition authority shall investigate it. The 
burden of proof shall rest on the party or the authority alleging an 
infringement of Article 101. That party shall prove the existence of an 
infringement to the required legal standard.166 The competition authorities 
are empowered to require that the infringement is brought to an end, order 
interim measures, accept commitments, imposing fines or other periodic 
penalty provided for in their national law.167 Usually a discovered bid 
rigging end up in fines for the involved but in some countries, for example 
in Germany, bid rigging is considered to be a criminal offense and the 
responsible can get imprisonment.168 
 
As stated the burden of proof rests on the party alleging an infringement and 
there is a presumption of innocence until the party alleging the infringement 
fulfilled the standard of proof.169 If the contracting authorities are aware of 
the standard of proof they will know what to focus on when preventing and 
detecting bid rigging and their chances to fight bid rigging and get the 
highest possible competition on their contracts will increase. When the 
contracting authority reports the suspicious bid rigging to the NCA it helps 
if the information gathered could be used as evidence.  
 
In Seamless steel tubes170 the ECJ held that the party having the burden of 
proof must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support 
the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place. However, it is 
not necessary that every single evidence satisfies the criteria listed. It is 
sufficient that the evidence viewed as a whole meets the criteria.171 The ECJ 
further held that that statements of a cartel from an employee of one of the 
members can be used to incriminate other members.172 However, it can not 
be regarded as constituting adequate proof if it is not supported by other 
evidence.173  
 
Evidence may be both written and oral and they can also be both direct and 
indirect. Direct evidence is different forms of documentary evidence.174 
When it comes to direct evidence such as agreements ECJ confirmed earlier 
case law when they in Cement stated that, 
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166 Regulation 1/2003, Recital 5 and Article 2. 
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172 Case T 67/00 JFE Engineering v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501 para 192. 
173 Case T 67/00 JFE Engineering v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501 para 219. 
174 De La Torre, Fernando Castillo, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, 
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“it is sufficient for the Commission to show that the undertaking concerned 
participated in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were 
concluded, without manifestly opposing them, to prove to the requisite 
standard that the undertaking participated in the cartel. Where participation 
in such meetings has been established, it is for that undertaking to put 
forward evidence to establish that its participation in those meetings was 
without any anti-competitive intention by demonstrating that it had 
indicated to its competitors that it was participating in those meetings in a 
spirit that was different from theirs”175 
 
When the proof for the alleged infringement is based on direct evidence 
such as documentary evidence, the burden of proof is shifted to the 
defendant that has to prove that the evidence is insufficient or that there is 
another plausible explanation for the conduct.176 However, direct evidence 
is not always available in cases of cartels and bid rigging. In the Cement 
case the ECJ emphasis that since it is well known that the participation in 
anti competitive agreements is prohibited the meeting are often held in 
secret and the documentation is limit to the minimum extent possible. Even 
if the Commission find evidence explicitly showing the unlawful contact 
between tenderers, such as records of meeting, they are often very 
fragmentary and spare and therefore it is necessary to reconstitute certain 
details by deduction. To prove the existence of an anti competitive conduct 
a number of coincidences and indicia must be considered together and if 
there is lack of another plausible explanation for the conduct it can 
constitute evidence for the infringement.177 The ECJ held that the 
combination of documentary evidence and company statements were direct 
documentary evidence of the alleged infringement of Article 101.178 The 
case is confirmed by latter case law, for example in the Swedish Asphalt 
Cartel earlier mentioned.179 
 
Parallel behaviour can be such coincidences mentioned and an indication of 
that anti competitive behaviour exists. When such behaviour is established 
and contact between the parties can be proved the conduct is likely to be 
inferred. Exchange of commercially confidential information or other close 
conduct is examples of such behaviour. The connection of relevant dates, 
such as price increase by all competitors on identical dates is another such 
behaviour. If the findings are simply based on such evidence, as parallel 
behaviour, it is not proof enough unless it is shown that it is the only 
plausible explanation for the conduct.180 
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Something that is going to be interesting to relate to later on in chapter 5 is 
the fact that in a case from the Hungarian Competition Office, 
Baucont/ÉPKER/KÉSZ,181 the presence of a subcontract agreement between 
two of the tenderers was evidence enough to prove the existence of 
competition violation. The agreement entitled the successful party to 
involve the other one in the execution of the contract as a subcontractor. 
Even if the tenderers had not agreed on whom to be the winner the risk 
inherent in taking part in an open competition was reduced and therefore it 
was liable to distort competition and increase the price.182 
 
To sum up, the documentary evidence does facilitate the possibility to prove 
an infringement. However, it is not required to fulfil the standard of proof. 
Indirect evidence, such as circumstantial evidence can in combination with 
the lack of other plausible explanations constitute evidence enough to prove 
an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. 
                                                
181 Baucont/ÉPKER/KÉSZ Case Vj-28/2003. 
182 Bellamy & Child, European community law of competition 2008, p 377. 
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5 Directive 2014/24/EU  
In the Green Paper the Commission emphasis that to be able to achieve 
efficiency and the best value for money it is vital to generate strongest 
possible competition and that distortion of competition must be avoided.183 
Followed by the Green Paper where they also expressed the need for a more 
simplified and flexible regime they published a proposal for a new Directive 
in 2011.184 The Commission emphasis that the modernisation mainly has 
two complementary objectives and the one relevant to the discussion below 
is to be read as followed,  
 
“Increase the efficiency of public spending to ensure the best possible 
procurement outcomes in terms of value for money. This implies in 
particular a simplification and flexibilisation of the existing public 
procurement rules. Streamlined, more efficient procedures will benefit all 
economic operators and facilitate the participation of SMEs and cross-
border bidders.”185 
 
On the 28th March 2014 the new Directives on public procurement were 
published in the OJ, and it entered into force on the twentieth day followed 
by its publication.186 The new and revised regime on public procurement 
consists of a revised Directive on Public Contracts187 and a revised Directive 
on the Utilities Sector.188 It also introduced a totally new Directive on 
concessions.189 Nevertheless, the following are only going to cover the 
former that is the Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU.190 The new Directive 
has an implementation period of 24 months instead of the usual 18 months 
because the amendments are considered to be very extensive. Accordingly 
the new Directive is going to repeal Directive 2004/18/EC with effect from 
the 18th April 2016.191 
 
The changes that are introduced in the new Directive are going to be 
elaborated below, one by one. It is going to be addressed how the introduced 
rules and changes are capable to open up the market and create effective 
competition but also how they are able to affect the tenderers’ possibility to 
create and sustain collusive agreements, such as bid rigging schemes.   
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5.1 Principles of procurement 
5.1.1 Legislative change 
The contracting authorities have to comply with the fundamental principles 
of EU law when awarding contracts. This is clear from Article 2 in the 
current Directive which states that the contracting authority shall treat all 
economic operators equally, non-discriminatory and that they shall act in a 
transparent way.  This provision is slightly modified in the new Directive 
and it also adds some other elements in the second subparagraph. The 
introduced principles of procurement is to be found in Article 18 in the new 
Directive, 
“1. Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and 
without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate 
manner. 
 
The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of 
excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially narrowing 
competition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed 
where the design of the procurement was made with the intention of 
unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators. […]” 
 
 
5.1.2 Reflections 
The Proposal from 2011 contained slightly the same wording of the 
principles of procurement although the final wording in the new Directive 
also contains a definition of “artificially narrowed competition”.192  
Followed by the Proposal, Graells argued that the new principle and the 
second subparagraph is a consolidation of the relevance of undistorted 
competition. He is also of the perception that the development shows that 
the rules have a clear orientation towards the safeguard of undistorted 
competition and that it therefore it could be expected that the new Directive 
contains some tools for the prevention and detection of bid rigging. Further, 
the inclusion of the principle of procurement shows that the public 
procurement rules should be interpreted and applied in a pro competitive 
way.193 He welcomes the provision as a positive development in public 
procurement law since it is a push towards a more competitive oriented 
system. One of the reasons is because it will raise awareness about 
competition implications to the contracting authorities.194 
 
                                                
192 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 47, Article 15. 
193 Sánchez Graells, Albert, Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the 
New EU Directive on Public Procurement 2014, p 10. 
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One of the recommendations from OECD is to raise the awareness of the 
risk of anti competitive behaviour and collusion amongst the public 
employees.195 In my view the introduction of principles of procurement has 
the potential to be very important for the increased awareness amongst the 
public purchasers. Even if this principle is directed to the design of the 
contract and not the behaviour of the tenderers I am of the perception that it 
can have effect on both sides of the transaction.  
 
The second subparagraph in Article 18 highlights the importance of not 
designing the procurement with the intention of unduly favouring or 
disadvantaging certain economic operators. This emphasis is a great 
complement and reinforcement of the principle of equal treatment. The 
importance of not having rules favouring certain economic operators will be 
apparent in the following section concerning the accessibility for SMEs.  
5.2 Facilitate access by SMEs 
One of the objectives with the new Directive is to facilitate participation by 
Small and Medium-Sized enterprises (SMEs).196 In 2008 the Commission 
developed a working document, the Code of Best Practice, in order to 
provide guidance to the Member States and their contracting authorities on 
how to facilitate access by SMEs to public procurement contracts.197 It 
might be questioned why this initiative is taken and why it is important to 
facilitate access by SMEs. The participation of SMEs can have many 
positive effects and is regarded as an important factor in increasing the 
competition within the EU. SMEs are often described as being the backbone 
of European economy.198 In some Member States they accounts for more 
than 90 per cent of all companies199 and they are very important for job 
creation, growth and innovation.200 It is not unusual that smaller firms are 
more efficient to provide small parts of bigger contracts since they are 
specialized.201 That is a few of the reasons why it is important to lower the 
barriers to entry and open up the public market for SMEs.  
 
Important to mention in relation to this is that the procurement rules are only 
allowed to be SME-fair and not SME-favouring since the principle of equal 
treatment means that all suppliers should be treated equal regardless of their 
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size or form of establishment. There is a lack of guidance and precedents 
from the EU law on the possibilities to facilitate for SMEs and the award of 
public contracts, and the balancing and demarcation is extremely 
complicated.202 Those uncertainties might be eliminated, or at least reduced 
by the modernised rules on how to facilitate access by SMEs.  
 
Even if the purpose of the public procurement regime is to open up the 
public market for all economic operators regardless of their size the 
Commission recognises a need for improvement to create a more accessible 
market for SMEs and start-ups but also to create a more competitive market 
in general.203 To facilitate access for SMEs the procedure has to be more 
efficient and the new Directive has to be simplified and more flexible. In the 
Code of Best Practice the Commission have identified a few problems that 
SMEs are facing in connection to the procurement process and what types 
of actions that can be taken by the Member States and the contracting 
authorities to overcome these obstacles. The large size of the contracts and 
the excessive requirements for financial guarantees are two of the problems 
that SMEs are facing.204 Below follows a thorough examination on the 
problematic raised and how they are addressed and introduced in the new 
Directive. 
 
5.2.1 Division of contracts into lots 
One difficulty that SMEs are facing and which also is identified by the 
Commission in the Code of Best Practice is the overcoming problems in 
relation to the size of the contracts in public markets. Because of their 
incapacity in giving tender for such a large contract they are de facto 
excluded from the procurement process.205 However, the contracting 
authority can either choose to procure the intended goods or services as one 
single contract or divide it into several smaller lots.206 The latter would be 
preferable to SMEs. Both quantitatively since the size is better suited to the 
productive capacity of SMEs and qualitatively because the content of the 
lots may correspond more closely to the business that the SME operates 
in.207 As mentioned, it is not unusual that smaller firms are more efficient to 
provide just a part of a bigger contract since they are specialized.208  
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5.2.1.1 Legislative changes 
There is no express provision on the division of contracts into lots in the 
current Directive. However, the current Directive indirect allows contracting 
authorities to make such division under Art 9(5).209 Other than that 
references to the division of contracts is only made in relation to the contract 
notice in Annex VII of the current Directive. The Annex states that if the 
contracts are divided into lots an indication of the possibility of tendering 
for one, for several or for all the lots needs to be included in the contract 
notice.210 As it is now, the Member States have a lot of discretion in 
deciding whether or not to set national procurement rules on the division on 
contract into lots. In other word they have a lot of discretion on how their 
procured contracts are going to affect the competition on the market.211  
 
There have been uncertainties on what is permissible and not when it comes 
to the division of contract into lots. One example of the use of division of 
contract into lots prior to the new Directive is the SCAs decision in 
Siemens212 in 2008. Siemens questioned the admissibility to divide contract 
into lots and restrict the tenderers’ possibility to give tender in all parts of 
the contract. The SCA held that such measure is permitted if it complies 
with the objectives with the Directive and the fundamental principles 
derived therefrom. To bring the uncertainties to an end, the new Directive 
introduces, for the first time in a public procurement Directive, a specific 
provision on division of contracts into lots. Article 46(1) expressly states 
that,  
 
“Contracting authorities may decide to award a contract in the form of 
separate lots and may determine the size and subject-matter of such lots.” 
 
In the second subparagraph the “divide or explain” rule is introduced, 
which implies that the main rule are the division into lots and if the 
contracting authority decide to deviate from that they shall provide an 
indication of the main reasons for their decision not to subdivide into lots.213 
If they however decide to divide the contract into lots they have to specify 
whether the tenders may be submitted only one, several or all lots. The 
contracting authority does also have the possibility to adopt a maximum 
number of lots that can be awarded to one tenderer.214 Article 46(3) 
emphasis that Member States may provide that, where more than one lot 
may be awarded to the same tenderer, contracting authorities may award 
contracts combining several or all lots where they have specified in the 
contract notice or in the invitation to confirm interest that they reserve the 
possibility of doing so and indicate the lots or groups of lots that may be 
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combined.215 The provision on division of contracts into lots also specifies 
that the Member States can, by specifying the conditions in national 
legislation and with regard to EU law, make it obligatory to award contracts 
into lots.216 
 
5.2.1.2 Reflections 
Prior to the new Directive there have been many analysts who have 
advocated the division of contracts into lots. The reasoning behind that is 
the knowledge that it can decrease the risk of collusive behaviour among the 
tenderers. The division of contracts into lots can have influence both on 
actual and future tendering result.217 Through doctrine there is a lot of 
discussion on the possible effects on the division of contracts into lots. It is 
possible to influence participation, the participants’ behaviour and the final 
outcome of the award of contracts. It also regulates how easy it is for 
competitors to split the contract between them and reach and sustain a 
collusive agreement.218  
 
Due to the large impact the division of contract into lots may have on 
competition there is one crucial decision to be made by the contracting 
authority, that is the number of lots to divide the contract in. There is a fine 
balance between dividing the contract into lots, which will foster 
participation and generate effective competition and the division of 
contracts into lots, which will facilitate anti competitive behaviour and 
collusion. Therefore the division of contracts has the potential to have both 
positive and negative effects, and there are some pitfalls to watch out for. In 
other words, it can both hinder and promote participation and effective 
competition.219 When deciding the number of lots there are two vital factors 
deriving from economic analysis. First of all, the number of lots needs to be 
smaller than the expected number of tenderers and secondly, at least one of 
the lots should be reserved to new entrants.220 
 
The reason for dividing the contracts into fewer lots than the expected 
number of participants is because a bid rigging scheme is dependent on the 
fact that all competitors can get “a share of the pie” and that is more 
complicated if the number of lots are smaller than the participants. 
Therefore the first rule of thumb is very useful, but there are also some 
limits that need to be recognized. Even if the contract is divided into an 
optimal number of lots a bid rigging scheme can be implemented through 
market allocation, bid rotation or subcontracting as a side transfer to share 
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the profits.221 There are also situations and markets where the number of 
qualified tenderers is limited, and then the increased number of lots above a 
certain threshold might even facilitate collusion.222 To sum up, the 
importance of dividing the contract into fewer lots than the number of 
participants might aggravate competitors’ possibilities to collude but the risk 
is not totally eliminated.  
 
The second vital factor is to define at least one lot more than the number of 
incumbents and reserve it to new entrants, such as SMEs. This would be a 
simple solution to the problem of an inaccessible public procurement 
market.223 Fana et al. argues that some of the public procurement rules are 
creating unequal treatment of companies since SMEs are facing harder times 
in the procedure. Consequently, the reserving of lots to SMEs and new 
entrants might actually reduce the unequal treatment that is already at 
place.224 Further, they are of the perception that these kinds of set asides to 
SMEs can be the most powerful tool in revamping the participation and 
breaking down barriers to trade by eliminating already existing 
discrimination.225 However, the EU does not favour making reservations of 
lots to specific undertaking. That would be in contradiction with the 
principle of equal treatment. The Commission rather advocate that the 
Member States should set up targets on shares of procurement that should 
be awarded to SMEs, to provide incentives for the contracting authorities to 
make the utmost of SME friendly procurement.226 
 
The setting aside to new entrants may also have negative effects on 
competition. For example, if the contracting authority have one lot reserved 
to new entrants and the new entrants are too weak the competition would 
have been better if also stronger operators where able to bid. If lots where to 
be reserved to new entrants it would reduce the number of lots available for 
incumbents at that would generate in a risk of incumbents disappearing from 
the market if they are not able to get a share of sizeable procurement 
contracts.227 As stated, the new Directive emphasis that the contracting 
authorities may limit the number of lots that may be awarded to one 
tenderer.228 In this part of the development I however think that the 
Commission has been somewhat contradictory to itself because in the Code 
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of Best Practice the Commission argued that there is an advantage of not 
limiting the number of lots that can be awarded to one tenderer. If the 
tenderers can be awarded an unlimited number of lots general contractors 
are not going to be discouraged to participate and the willingness to grow 
will not be discouraged.229  
 
Further on, the division of contract into lots might not be efficient under all 
circumstances. There is a risk that the division of contracts actually generate 
negative effects on participation and competition. An example of such a 
situation is when the division of contract into lots not is feasible due to 
technical or economically factors. Graells emphasis this and states that the 
rules on division of contracts; 
 
“should allow for sufficient flexibility so as not to artificially impose the 
fractioning of the contractual object where it is technically or economically 
unfeasible, or where it would substantially impair the effectiveness of the 
procurement process or raise the procurement costs disproportionately.”230 
 
The second subparagraph makes such “sufficient flexibility” possible but, as 
I interpret it, Article 46(4) makes it possible to implement national 
legislation removing this flexibility. From this perspective I am sceptical 
against the Member States possibility to make it obligatory to subdivide 
contracts. There might actually be circumstances making it ineffective were 
the possibility to procure it, as one single contract is vital for effectiveness.  
 
The original proposal from the Commission from 2011 sets out a certain 
threshold on 500.000 euro in which over that threshold the division of 
contracts into lots shall be mandatory. Graells emphasis that it is more than 
50 per cent of all procurement procedures that has an estimated value below 
this threshold and therefore the removal of this threshold would be 
preferable since it would generate potential further development. Then the 
contracting authorities have to conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether it 
is sufficient or not to split the contract into lots.231 In the final wording in 
the new Directive this threshold is removed, however there is a provision 
stating that the Member States have the discretion to make it obligatory. The 
introduced provision leaves it to the discretion of the Member States to 
create an effective obligation to divide contracts into lots.232 
 
As mentioned above OECD recommends a design of the contracts that is 
maximising the participation of competing bidders.233 One part of this 
recommendation is the possible to bid on certain lots. They recommend that 
you should look for specific areas in larger contracts that could be attractive 
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and appropriate for SMEs.234 Even if the lots might be divided into different 
sizes and new entrants and SMEs only are able to procure on the smaller 
lots it will generate a more competitive market overall. It will raise 
competition on the lots that new entrants are able to give tender on but it can 
also have the positive effect of increasing competition among incumbents, 
since there are fewer contracts to compete for.235 Except from the fact that 
the division of contracts into lots can create effective competition it can also 
have a positive effect on the possibility to create a bid rigging scheme. 
OECD recommends varying between aggregation of contracts and not since 
it will result in unpredictability which in turn will make it more difficult to 
create a collusive agreement for the tenderers.236  
 
It is not possible to avoid the difficulties in deciding the optimal number of 
lots and when to divide and not. There needs to be a balance between 
dividing contracts into lots to the advantageous of SMEs and the 
aggregation of contracts for the advantageous and retention of bigger firms 
able to supply bigger parts of the contract. Keeping the bigger firms on the 
market are vital otherwise they will seek to other contracts generating more 
profit. The restrictions on how many lots to be divided to every tenderer and 
whether there should be a maximum or not should therefore be carefully 
thought through before implemented.  
 
To sum up, the division can have both positive and negative effects and to 
avoid the negative effects the contracting authorities need to have a lot of 
knowledge about the market. There are many uncertainties on how the 
division of contracts into lots should be applied, and to have an effective 
application of the provision it requires much further guidance for the 
Member States and most importantly for the contracting authorities. The 
provision makes the procurement process much more flexible, as required 
but I am however sceptical against its contribution to a more simplified 
regime. Overall I think that the development is in the right direction, an 
express provision about division of contract into lots will raise the 
awareness of its possibilities and if it is implemented effectively 
participation will increase and the risk of bid rigging decrease. Graells 
consider that the provision is in general “well oriented and substantially 
aligned with economic theory” which will contribute to the prevention of 
collusive behaviour amongst the tenderers.237  
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5.2.2 Limitation on requirements of participation 
Another difficulty that SMEs are facing when trying to access the public 
market is the excessive requirements for financial guarantees that the 
contracting authorities set up in their selection criteria.238 In the current 
Directive a tenderer can be excluded because they do not live up to the 
specified “economic and financial standing”. The requirement on “economic 
and financial standing” in Article 47 are not defined but means that the 
economic operator has sufficient resources to perform the relevant contract 
in parallel with their other commitments.239 A contracting authority must 
state such minimum annual turnover requirement in their contract notice. 
However, such requirements must be “related and proportionate to the 
subject-matter of the contract”.240  
 
5.2.2.1 Legislative change 
In the Green Paper the Commission proposes a cap on excessively 
demanding selection criteria, especially requirements relating to economic 
and financial standing. The Commission emphasis that such overly 
demanding turnover requirements do unavoidably exclude SMEs.241 A cap 
like that would improve the already existing condition on proportionality 
but the Commission also emphasis that it might restrict the contracting 
authorities “freedom to determine which standards they deem necessary to 
ensure that the contract is implemented properly”.242 Nevertheless, such 
provision is included in the new Directive that adopts an exhaustive list243 
on qualitative selection criteria. It is held that the selection criteria may 
relate to economic and financial standing.244 The contracting authorities are 
allowed to require that the economic operator have a certain minimum 
annual turnover to ensure that they have the capacity to perform the 
contract.245 However there are some limitations and exemptions introduced 
in the new Directive; 
 
“The minimum yearly turnover that economic operators are required to 
have shall not exceed two times the estimated contract value, [my 
emphasis] except in duly justified cases such as relating to the special risks 
attached to the nature of the works, services or supplies. […]”246 
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If the contracting authority finds that there is a need to make such an 
exemption mentioned the main reasons for such a requirement should be 
states in the procurement documents.247 Such derogation must however still 
be proportionate and linked to the subject matter of the contract.248 If the 
contract is divided into lots in accordance with Article 46 in the new 
Directive the turnover requirements shall apply in relation to each individual 
lot.249  
 
5.2.2.2 Reflections 
Since turnover requirement are a frequently and recognized obstacle to 
SMEs the introduced changes are going to avoid such unjustified barriers to 
entry.250 The limitation on turnover requirements is pro competitive since it 
reduces barriers to entry on the public market without having any 
detrimental effects from a competition law perspective.251 To increase 
participation and prevent the risk of collusion OECD recommends that the 
contracting authorities should avoid setting unnecessary restrictions on the 
tenderers size, since it reduces participation.252 This limitation on 
requirement is capable to contribute to that. In other words it will facilitate 
participation by SMEs and create a more effective competition on the public 
market. 
 
I am of the perception that the turnover cap can be useful, even if it is 
possible to derogate from it. The proportionality of a turnover requirement 
is a case-by-case assessment and Article 58(3) contributes to the fact that 
such an assessment does not have to be done. Consequently, having this 
provision limited to two times value contracts is a codification of what is 
proportionate. From my point of view that is a great development since it 
creates greater legal certainty and uniformity, both for the contracting 
authorities but also for the tenderers. Consequently, SMEs and other 
companies will know what least to be expected from them and then it will 
be easier for them to participate and prepare for a procurement process. 
Having clear requirements is something that is advocated by OECD in 
relation to the prevention of bid rigging.253  
 
Even though the positive effects are apparent there are some criticisms 
raised toward the introduced turnover cap. Fana et al. emphasis that the 
limitations will be useful not only to SMEs, but also for bigger firms and 
even if it might make participation by SMEs more likely it does not reduce 
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the competitive disadvantage that SMEs have when entering into a tender.254 
Further on, one of the issued raised in the Green Paper was that the 
procurement should be more accessible for start-ups.255 However, I am 
sceptical against how this turnover requirement is going to help start-ups to 
get access to the public market since they just started their business and does 
not have any turnover yet. On the other hand the contracting authorities are 
spending public funds and their needs to be some security in that the 
contract is being performed. Further, turnover requirements is not always 
the optimal way to decide the most suitable tenderer. To exclude unsuitable 
tenderers and to ensure that suitable ones are not excluded it would be 
preferable to make an overall discretionary assessment of the tenderers 
financial situation instead of setting specific minimum requirements. Even if 
it would not be so transparent it would promote effective competition.256 
Overall, the introduction of a turnover cap reflects the principle of 
proportionality and in my perception very welcomed to ensure legal 
certainty. Even if it the provision and the turnover cap is not mandatory 
until the Directive enters into force it can have a guiding effect during the 
implementation period. 
5.2.3 Overall reflections on the changes 
When the stakeholders257 had the chance to give answers to the Green Paper 
it was shown that the opinions about the necessity of measures such as 
turnover caps and mandatory splitting into lots were not very unanimous. 
The public authorities were in general very sceptical against these types of 
measures when on the other side of the transaction side, the business’ 
opinions were very divided.258 Of course there is some scepticism against 
these types of measures from the contracting authorities point of view since 
the resources required dividing the contracts into lots in an efficient way 
will be an administrative burden for them and they will take an increased 
risks when lowering the turnover requirement. However, such 
administrative burden and risk should be weighted against the benefits 
derived from effective competition on the procured contracts.  
All the elements that are aimed at facilitating participation by SMEs are also 
going to have an impact on the creation of effective competition on the 
public market. As one of the risk factors for collusion is the fact there are 
few suppliers the facilitated access by SMEs are going to obstruct the 
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tenderers’ possibilities to create and sustain collusive agreements. Heimler 
stresses one important change to be done in order to make collusive 
behaviour harder, that is that the rules should favour small firms more.259 If 
the rules are able to open up the market to SMEs the competition will 
increase not just because it is more participants but also because SMEs are 
one of the most important sources of innovations. If it is possible to increase 
their participation in the public market the incumbents will be forced to also 
invest in innovation. However it is worth noting that bid rigging often 
occurs in markets without significant innovation.260 
My perception is that if the division of contracts into lots are applied 
efficiently and the limitation on requirements are followed, and not 
exempted by the contracting authorities, the combination can have a 
desirable effect on lowering the barriers to entry, enhance competition and 
prevention of anti competitive behaviour. The turnover requirement is a 
minimum requirement and need to be implemented by all Member States 
when on the other hand the division of contract is, to some extent, optional. 
Consequently, the impact that this will have on competition and the 
possibility to fight bid rigging depends on how each and every Member 
States chooses to implement the rules. 
 
5.3 European Single Procurement Document 
Another difficulty identified by the Commission in the Code of Best 
Practice is the excessive administrative burden that SMEs are facing when 
trying to access the public procurement market.261 The burden derives from 
the need to produce substantial number of certificates or other documents 
related to exclusion and selection criteria.262 A large amount of paperwork 
can hinder economic operators’ possibility to give tender. The 
administrative burden can be especially burdensome if the tenderer ends up 
not being the one that is awarded the contract. 
5.3.1 Legislative change 
As a solution on the issue of high administrative burden placed on the 
tenderers the new Directive introduces, for the first time, a European Single 
Procurement Document (ESPD). It is a standard document and will be 
provided in all languages and all public authorities will be obliged to share 
the information on qualified bidders on national databases.263 The provision 
on ESPD is to be found in Article 59, 
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“1. At the time of submission of requests to participate or of tenders, 
contracting authorities shall [my emphasis] accept the European Single 
Procurement Document (ESPD), consisting of an updated self-declaration 
as preliminary evidence in replacement of certificates issued by public 
authorities or third parties confirming that the relevant economic operator 
fulfils the following conditions: 
 
(a) it is not in one of the situations referred to in Article 57 in which 
economic operators shall or may be excluded;  
 
(b) it meets the relevant selection criteria that have been set out pursuant 
to Article 58; […]”264 
 
The system is based on the fact that the contracting authorities shall accept 
self-declaration instead of requiring complete documentation and 
certificates. Only when the contracting authority has chosen to whom to 
award the contract the winning tenderer has to submit the original, up-to-
date supporting documentation.265 It is clear from Article 60 that this can be 
used as means of proof and the contracting authorities may require the 
ESPD as evidence for the absence of grounds for exclusion as referred to in 
Article 57 and for the fulfilment of the selection criteria in accordance with 
Article 58.266 
 
The use of ESPD limits the requirements and can reduce the administrative 
burden and simplify the procedure for contracting authorities, but most 
important for the economic operators.267 The Commission estimates that the 
introduction of ESPD can reduce the administrative burden by over 80 per 
cent.268 
 
The Commission is going to make all language version of the ESPD 
available through e-Certis, a newly introduced online repository of 
certificates.269 E-Certis is an “online source of information to help 
companies and contracting authorities to cope with the different forms of 
documentary evidence required for cross-border tenders for public 
contracts.”270 The newly introduced electronic database is a way to create 
better mutual recognition of certificates.271 Better mutual recognition of 
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certificates has the potential to increase cross border trade, which is 
important to achieve fair and effective competition on the public market.272  
 
E-Certis can be useful both from a national and from a cross-border 
perspective. Within the Member States it is useful for first time bidders, 
since they in an easy way can get information about what types of 
documents usually required. The online source is also going to contribute to 
the increased participation by cross border bidders. Costs and uncertainties 
deriving from having to submit certificates in another format than they are 
used to are one of the things that can deter them from bidding. The online 
source can to some extent eliminate that obstacle. It is necessary to point out 
that the e-Certis does not cover all potential documents that can be required 
but only the most frequently requested documents.273 
5.3.2 Reflections 
As mentioned the introduction of ESPD and the easy accessibility trough e-
Certis are going to reduce the administrative burden. The modernisation 
reflects the principle of mutual recognition. Consequently, it has the 
possibility to both facilitate access by SMEs and increase cross border 
participation. The Green Paper held that the cross border participation in 
public procurement remains low. Recent studies show that only 1,6 per cent 
of the public contracts is awarded to a tender from another Member State.274 
If the public market is more opened up to foreign competition the risk of 
collusion will decrease. The reason for that can be due to various factors. 
Mainly because it raises overall participation and competition in a tendering 
procedure and as stated above that complicates the possibilities to 
implement a bid rigging scheme. It can also depend on the fact that foreign 
competitors might come from a different business culture and it can also just 
be that simple that contacts between foreign and domestic competitors are 
more unusual than contact between two domestic competitors.275 
 
There is however some scepticism against the introduced system of ESPD. 
With the same reasoning as regarding the limitation on turnover 
requirements Fana et al. emphasis that this change are going to apply to all 
economic operators, regardless of their size, which means that it is only 
reducing moderately the competitive advantage that information obligations 
in general give to large firms compared to small ones.276 Graells is of the 
opinion that the provision generates higher risks and difficulties than 
benefits. He is sceptical to the provision because he is concerned about the 
time limits. He thinks that it is necessary to set up “speedy but reasonable” 
time limits to produce the requested documents and to strengthen the 
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consequences of failing to produce supporting evidence for self -
declaration.277   
  
Nonetheless, I am of the perception that is will have another important and 
positive function than just reducing the red tape and facilitate access to 
SMEs. The self-declaration shall include the assurance of that the economic 
operators have not engaged in any of the activities which forms the basis of 
exclusion under Article 57. One of the activities referred to is the entering 
into agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting 
competition.278 OECD highlights that this type of self-declaration will help 
to remind the tenderers of their obligation to bid independently and not 
collude, and also emphases the penalties that can follow from collusion.279  
 
The ESPD can be equated with a system that is already advocated by the 
OECD and used by a few countries, for example Sweden and Germany. The 
OECD has referred to it as the Certificate of Independent Bidding and it 
requires bidders to disclose all material facts about any communication that 
they have had with competitors in relation to the invitation to tender.280 
OECD recommends it when designing a tender process since it effectively 
reduces communication among tenderers.281 
 
One of the reasons and benefits with having the Certificate of Independent 
Bidding is because it is much easier to proof that competitors have 
communicated with each other than proving the existence of a cartel.282 As 
said, it already is in use in some Member States but now it has been codified 
in the new Directive and this introduction of an ESPD in the Directive is 
going to create harmonisation and legal certainty within the EU. Hopefully 
this will have a deterrent effect on the creation of collusive agreements, but 
also the possibility use it as documentary evidence when trying to reveal 
and prove a bid rigging scheme.  
5.4 Exclusion of tenderers  
As elaborated in chapter 4 there is a lot of guidance on how to prevent and 
detect bid rigging. The Green Paper however questions whether such 
guidance is enough to fight collusion efficiently or whether there is a need 
for specific legislative instrument. Such an instrument could be a stricter 
debarment in case of bid rigging for example.283 To be able to ensure fair 
and effective competition and prevent anti competitive behaviour it is 
important that there is a possibility for the contracting authorities to exclude 
                                                
277 Sánchez Graells, Albert, “Are the Procurement Rules a Barrier for Cross-border Trade 
within the European Market” in Graells., Ølykke, Grith, EU Procurement Directives - 
modernisation, growth & innovation 2012, p 121. 
278 For further explanation see chapter 5.4. 
279 OECD, Designing tenders to reduce Bid Rigging, p 10. 
280 OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 8. 
281 OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p 8. 
282 Report from the Swedish Competition Authority, ”Osund konkurrens 
i offentlig upphandling - Om lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel, 2013:6”, p 147. 
283 Green Paper, p 32. 
 47 
such tenderers engaging in anti competitive behaviour from the procurement 
procedure. The following are therefore going to examine the changes made 
in the new Directive in relation to debarment of competition law infringers, 
or as referred to in the Directive, exclusion of tenderers.  
5.4.1 Legislative change 
In the current Directive the grounds for exclusion are listed in inter alia 
Article 45. In La Cascina284 the ECJ held that the grounds for exclusion has 
to be set out in advance by the contracting authority and they are only 
allowed to use exclude grounds that are listed. This ruling is in compliance 
with the general principles of transparency and equal treatment.285 Article 
45(2) states that a contracting authority can exclude a tenderer that has been 
convicted of any offence concerning his professional misconduct or guilty of 
grave professional misconduct proven by the contracting authority.286 There 
is some ambiguity on whether “professional misconduct” can be used in 
order to exclude economic operators engaging in collusive agreements. 
There is a however a clear indication that there is room for the inclusion of 
competition law breaches within the relevant concept of professional 
misconduct.287 Bovis stress that violations of competition law should always 
be considered instances of grave professional misconduct and consequently 
should qualify indistinctly under both paragraph c) and d) of Article 45(2) in 
the current Directive.288 Graells further emphasis that all kinds of anti 
competitive behaviour should be caught by the concept of offence 
concerning professional conduct or professional misconduct.289 Followed 
by the new Directive this seems clearly established.290 Recital 101 in the 
new Directive establishes that the professional misconduct is supposed to 
include violations of competition rules. However, the exclusion grounds that 
are found in the current Directive under Article 45(2) c) which is the 
exclusion of economic operators who has been convicted of any offence 
concerning his professional misconduct has been deleted in the new 
Directive. It was probably deleted because of the wide interpretation of the 
existing ground relating to the grave professional misconduct, which is now 
to be found in the new Directive in Article 57(4) c).291 
 
Except from the fact that violations of competition law are included in the 
term professional misconduct in recital 101 in the new Directive, the 
exclusion of competition law infringer becomes codified in the new 
Directive. The new provision of grounds for exclusion is to be found in 
Article 57 and it sets out both mandatory and discretionary grounds for 
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exclusion. The exclusion grounds set out in Article 57(4) are discretionary 
which means that the, 
 
“Contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member 
States to exclude from participation in an procurement procedure any 
economic operator in any of the following situations”292  
 
And the exclusion of competition law infringers is to be found in Article 
57(4) d),  
 
“Where the contracting authority has sufficiently plausible indications to 
conclude that the economic operator has entered into agreements [my 
emphasis] with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition 
[my emphasis]”293 
 
Article 57(5) further holds that the grounds for exclusion can be applied at 
all times during the procurement procedure, it can be used both before and 
during the procedure.294 This is an important clarification from the current 
Directive and Article 45 that does not define the time period during which 
an economic operator can be excluded.295 
 
If an economic operator is in the situation referred to in Article 57(4) d) they 
should be able to set things right and be a part of the procurement anyway. 
The new Directive therefore identifies the possibility of self-cleaning 
measures. The purpose it that the economic operators shall be able to regain 
its eligibility to be part of a public procurement procedure.296 The possibility 
of self-cleaning is to be found in Article 57(6), 
 
“Any economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 4 may provide evidence to the effect that measures taken 
by the economic operator are sufficient to demonstrate its reliability 
despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such evidence is 
considered as sufficient, the economic operator concerned shall not be 
excluded from the procurement procedure […]”297 
 
The possibility for self-cleaning requires that the tenderer can prove that 
they have compensated any damages caused by the criminal offence or 
misconduct, clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive 
manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities and taken 
concrete technical, organisational and personal measures that are 
appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct.298 The 
possibility to self-cleaning reflects the principle of proportionality.299  
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Further on, the Article provides a requirement on the Member States to 
specify the implementing conditions of the Article and determine the 
maximum period of exclusion. In regard to discretionary exclusion based on 
distortion of competition the maximum period of exclusion is three years 
from the date of the relevant event.300 
5.4.2 Reflections 
Worth mentioning is that the wording in Article 57(4) d), in relation to 
exclusion based on distortion of competition, is clearly different from the 
wording in Article 101 TFEU. First of all, the wording in Article 57(4) d) 
only extends to the ground for exclusion to agreements, and not to decisions 
or concerted practices as under Article 101. Secondly, the agreement must 
have as its aim to distort competition. When on the other hand Article 101 
covers both practices that have as their object and effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition.301 To reach coherence between the 
two systems and efficiently prevent all types of anti competitive behaviour I 
am of the perception that it would be preferable to use the same wording 
under both Article 57(4) d) and Article 101.  
 
Even if bid rigging schemes are always aimed at distorting competition it 
does not always take expression in an agreement. As elaborated above in 
chapter 4.2.3 the positive thing stemming from case law when it comes to 
prove an anti competitive behaviour is that in cases of complex 
infringements there is no need to prove if there has been an agreement or a 
concerted practice. However, a narrow interpretation of this provision would 
require such specification, which would result in a more complex 
assessment of evidence. With regard to the earlier case law in La Cascina 
where it is clear that the list of exclusion grounds is exhaustive there is an 
indication that there will be a narrow scope of the article, which means that 
the grounds for exclusion will not cover anti competitive behaviour to the 
same extent as under Article 101.302 Due to the indication of a narrow scope 
there is a risk that it is not always going to be possible to prove and exclude 
tenderers engaging in anti competitive behaviour, such as bid rigging.  
 
In relation to this it is also worth mentioning that even if there is now 
possibility to exclude tenderers based on the exclusion grounds due to the 
difficulties of proving an agreement or the aim there is another chance to 
end the procedures when there is a suspicious of bid rigging for example. 
The consequence of a bid rigging scheme can often be that there is only one 
suitable tender left and in Metalmeccanica303 ECJ held that the contracting 
authority is not required to award the contract to the only suitable tender. In 
the case there was 4 tenderers submitting a bid in the open procedure 
arranged by the contracting authority, but after evaluation there was only 
one suitable tender left and the contracting authority decided to terminate 
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the tender procedure, which was also held to be perfectly permitted. The 
interesting part in the judgement from this thesis point of view is that the 
judgement was based on the objectives of public procurement to develop 
effective competition.304 The contracting authorities should be aware of the 
fact that they can do this even if it is not stated in neither in the current nor 
in the new Directive. 
 
Graells wish for further clarification and streamlining of the disqualification 
procedure.305 He is of the perception that there is still a need for the 
suspension and exclusion system in the public procurement rules to be 
further developed. Further he mentions that such optimal terms that stems 
from the provisions can give rise to different regimes in different Member 
States and as a consequent facilitate strategic behaviour by economic 
operators. To strengthen the pro competitive orientation of the public 
procurement and to decrease the distortion of competition created by 
economic operators, Graells is in favour of a more strict and uniform system 
of the exclusion of competition law infringers.306  
 
In regard to the possibility of self-cleaning I am of the perception that it will 
definitely be positive for the creation of effective competition. Priess 
emphasis that it reflects the principle of proportionality and he is of the 
opinion that allowing economic operators to rehabilitate themselves, under 
strict conditions, could enhance competition and therefore it is a positive 
aspect of the modernised Directive.307 Even if Article 57 leaves a lot of 
questions unanswered it is a step towards a greater harmonisation of the 
public procurement law in the EU, especially the introduction of self-
cleaning and maximum time limits.308 
 
I am about to agree with both Graells and Preiss, the development is 
welcomed but it needs much more. The measures are adopted on a voluntary 
basis by both the contracting authorities and the Member States and it is up 
to them that the Article reaches its full potential. However, the potential is 
limited due to its narrow scope. The clarified and amended exclusion 
grounds are going to provide legal certainty and in combination with the 
introduced ESPD it can be helpful for the fighting of collusive agreements. 
The legislator should however review its limits and revise the provision to 
get a wider scope.  
 
It is undeniable other interesting amendments on exclusion grounds which 
would be interesting to analyse. However the introduced and elaborated 
exclusion grounds of distortion of competition is the most and direct 
interesting in this regard.  
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5.5 Subcontracting 
The optimal situation for an economic operator is to win contracts 
themselves because subcontracting usually tends to lower profits. Since 
public contracts usually are of very large size it is very likely that SMEs are 
not able to be the main contractor and therefore it is very likely that 
subcontracts are taken by SMEs.309 However, this is not always trouble free 
for SMEs. Long delays in payments are one of many problems that SMEs 
are facing. Even if they are assigned the works and completes it there is a 
risk that they are driven out from the market due to slow payment from the 
main contractor.310 The stricter rules on subcontracting are mainly 
introduced to prevent social dumping but also with the purpose of facilitate 
access by SMEs. Nevertheless, the following are also going to highlight the 
changes and its chance to create effective competition and the possibility to 
fight collusive agreements.  
5.5.1 Legislative change 
There are very limited rules on subcontracting in the current Directive.311 
However, with the objective of encouraging the involvement of SMEs in the 
public procurement market the current Directive advocate that provisions on 
subcontracting should be included.312 In respect to this, Article 25 is the 
only provision relating to public contracts and subcontracting in the current 
Directive and it is read as follows,  
 
“In the contract document, the contracting authority may ask or may be 
required by a Member State to ask the tenderer to indicate in his tender any 
share of the contract he may intend to subcontract to third parties and any 
proposed subcontractors”.313 
 
As it looks today there is only a small possibility for the contracting 
authority to monitor and control subcontracting. The only possibility for a 
contracting authority to restrict subcontracting is when they are unable to 
verify the capacity of the subcontractor.314 The new Directive provides for a 
more extensive and tougher provision on subcontracting. The rules on 
subcontracting are to be found in Article 71 in the new Directive.  
 
First of all, Article 71 includes the wording of Article 25 from the current 
Directive. Although the wording is slightly modified the changes are not 
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going to affect the meaning of it.315 Secondly, the new Directive and Article 
71 introduces an added provision on direct payment to subcontractors,  
 
3. Member States may provide that at the request of the subcontractor 
[my emphasis] and where the nature of the contract so allows, the 
contracting authority shall transfer due payments directly to the 
subcontractor [my emphasis] for services, supplies or works provided to 
the economic operator to whom the public contract has been awarded (the 
main contractor). Such measures may include appropriate mechanisms 
permitting the main contractor to object to undue payments. The 
arrangements concerning that mode of payment shall be set out in the 
procurement documents.316 
 
In relation to the direct payment to subcontractors the article further 
specifies that the Member States may provide more stringent liability rules 
under national law on direct payments to subcontractors. For instance by 
providing direct payment without it being necessary for the subcontractor to 
request such direct payment.317 
 
Finally, the amended article on subcontracting adds an extended possibility 
for the contracting authority to require information about the subcontractor. 
It is clear in the first subparagraph of Article 71(5) that, 
 
“In the case of works contracts and in respect of services to be provided at 
a facility under the direct oversight of the contracting authority, after the 
award of the contract and at the latest when the performance of the contract 
commences, the contracting authority shall require the main contractor to 
indicate to the contracting authority the name, contact details and legal 
representatives of its subcontractors, [my emphasis] involved in such 
works or services, in so far as known at this point in time. The contracting 
authority shall require the main contractor to notify the contracting 
authority of any changes to this information during the course of the 
contract as well as of the required information for any new subcontractors 
which it subsequently involves in such works or services.”318 
 
The first subparagraph in Article 71(5) does not apply to suppliers but 
contracting authorities may extend or may be required by the Member State 
to extend the obligation to for instance “supply contracts, to service 
contracts other than those concerning services to be provided at the facilities 
under the direct oversight of the contracting authority or to supplier 
involved in works or services contract”.319 
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5.5.2 Reflections 
The direct payment to subcontractors can be a tool to avoid the burden of 
long delays in payment and facilitate the involvement of SMEs.320 If the risk 
of delays in payment are lowered, as it should be since the public purchaser 
are more liable, there is a greater chance that SMEs are not driven out from 
the public procurement market. Even if the direct payment to subcontractors 
is useful it is not directly meant to support SMEs, when talking about 
support to SMEs it is often meant to support them as the main contractor.321 
The amended article on subcontracting does not increase participation by 
SMEs as main contractors. Therefore, it cannot be argued to create effective 
competition and aggravate the tenderers’ possibility to create and sustain 
collusive agreements because of increased participation, as argued for above 
changes.  
 
The stricter rules and the increased possibility to monitor subcontracting and 
require information about the subcontractor can have other important ways 
to affect competition. Especially since subcontracting can be used as a 
compensating mechanism within a bid rigging scheme.322 The competitors 
can have an agreement were they decide that the winner company are going 
to compensate its competitor by engaging them as subcontractors.323 A 
Swedish example of this is a procurement regarding power poles. The 
companies agreed on that the one who won the contract had to buy half of 
their need from the other one.324 OECD suggests that the contracting 
authorities should pay extra attention to certain bidding patterns, such as 
that the winning tenderer repeatedly subcontract works to unsuccessful 
tenderers. The most common scenario is that the unsuccessful tenderer is 
rejected to due a higher price or unacceptable requirements.325 The 
problematic with the current rules on subcontracting is that the contracting 
authorities may require the information on the share and amount that is 
going to be subcontracted but they are not entitled to know to whom it is to 
be subcontracted. Cartel formation is facilitated when it is possible to make 
transactions within the bid rigging scheme without having the contracting 
authority monitoring everything. 326 The contracting authorities’ possibility 
to require information is therefore going to create a better chance for them 
to monitor subcontracts and detect suspicious bidding patterns. Accordingly, 
it is going to be harder for the tenderers to create and sustain a bid rigging 
scheme. If the Member States take the opportunity to implement even 
stricter rules on subcontracting the chance will increase even more.  
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The Green Paper highlights that experiences also suggests that it might be 
useful to make certain instruments which present a particular risk of being 
misused for collusion more "collusion-proof". Subcontracting can be such 
an instrument, since it a popular way for the winning bidder to reward cartel 
members for abiding by the cartel agreement. One possible way to address 
this problem could be to forbid, under certain conditions, subcontracting to 
undertakings which participated themselves in the tender procedure.327 The 
stakeholders in the response to the Green Paper raise another suggestion for 
instruments to ensure fair competition and encourage pro-competitive 
procurement strategies. They suggest that the contracting authorities should 
have the possibility to restrict subcontracting if there are indications of anti 
competitive behaviour.328 However, the new Directive does not say anything 
explicit about neither the prohibiting subcontracting to avoid anti 
competitive behaviour or a prohibition on subcontracting to unsuccessful 
tenderers. Further, the Green Paper highlights that the advantages derived 
from such additional guarantees against anti competitive behaviour must be 
weighted against the additional administrative burden that is put on the 
procurers and the undertakings.329  
I would say that a provision restricting subcontracting to unsuccessful 
tenderer and when there is indication of anti-competitive behaviour does not 
reflect the principle of proportionality. It would not be proportionate to have 
such restrictions without having provisions similar to the once in Article 57 
on self-cleaning and time limits.  
An interesting reflection is whether the fact that the winning tenderer 
subcontracts parts of the agreement to an unsuccessful tenderer could be 
regarded as enough evidence to prove a bid rigging scheme and an 
infringement of Article 101. If the main contractor subcontracts parts of the 
agreement to an unsuccessful tenderer it should be an indication of bid 
rigging scheme in my view. It is clear from the case from the Hungarian 
Competition Office, as elaborated in chapter 4.2.2, that the existence of a 
subcontract can be evidence enough. The stricter rules on subcontracting 
can therefore he helpful for the burden of proof.  
I am of the perception that the development of the possibilities to control 
and monitor subcontracting is consistent with the principle of transparency. 
If the contracting authorities are required to have an open and transparent 
procedure the same should apply towards all steps of the transaction. Even if 
the improved rules on subcontracting might develop the integration of the 
public procurement market I however think that the legislator could have 
gone even further on its path towards harmonisation. They could have 
introduced a provision that allows the contracting authorities to restrict 
whether a tenderer engaging in anti competitive behaviour or an 
unsuccessful tenderer can be a subcontractor or not. However it should be 
on the conditions that they also implement rules on self-cleaning and time 
limits.  
                                                
327 Green Paper, p 32. 
328 Commission, Green Paper, synthesis to reply, p 14. 
329 Green Paper, p 32. 
 55 
6 Analysis and conclusion  
To begin with, I would like to summarize the above-mentioned changes and 
briefly explain their capacity to create effective competition and chance to 
affect the tenderers’ possibility to create and sustain a collusive agreement.  
 
First of all, the second subparagraph in the principles of procurement330 is 
going to have the effect of raising the contracting authorities awareness of 
the risk of anti competitive behaviour. The introduced principles are a push 
towards a more competitive oriented system. Secondly, the flexibility of 
applying the division of contract into lots331 has the potential to create a 
more unpredictable public procurement process. It also has the potential, if 
applied effectively, to increase participation among suppliers. However, it 
can be questioned if the complexity in the possibility to divide contract into 
lots makes the Directive more simplified, as wanted. Thirdly, the introduced 
limitations on requirements332 and the turnover cap are a codification of 
what is proportionate and it is going to make it easier for the economic 
operators to know what is expected from them. Due to the cap it is going to 
be easier for SMEs to give a tender. The division into lots and the 
limitations on requirements are going to enhance participation and create 
effective competition and in extension that it is going to obstruct the 
tenderers’ possibility to create and sustain a collusive agreements.  
 
Fourthly, the introduction of ESPD333 is going to lower the barriers to entry 
and hopefully generate in more participation. Further on it is possible that it 
can contribute to the detection and proving of the existence of anti 
competitive behaviour. Fifthly, the introduction of clarified rules on the 
exclusion of tenderers334 are going to provide legal certainty since it is 
codified that there is room for exclusion if the tenderers engaged in anti 
competitive behaviour. However, it is important to note that the limited 
scope of the provision prevents the possibility to reach full coherence with 
Article 101 TFEU. The introduction of ESPD and the amended clearer rules 
on exclusion of tenderers are also going to raise the awareness of 
competition law concerns amongst the contracting authorities. 
 
Finally, the extended rules on subcontracting335 are going to improve the 
contracting authorities’ possibility to monitor subcontracting and because of 
that it is going to be easier to detect bid rigging. Both the ESPD, the 
exclusion grounds and the extended rules on subcontracting has the 
possibility to create a higher risk of being detected, which in turn can have a 
deterrent effect for the creation of collusive agreements. Consequently, it 
will undermine the tenderers’ possibility to sustain such an agreement.  
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It is important to note that the effects of the changes are dependent on the 
political will in each and every Member State and by the contracting 
authorities. Since the Directive on public procurement is a minimum 
requirement Directive there is a lot of discretion left to the Member States 
when implementing the Directive in national legislation. Which has to be 
done no later than 2016. Some of the provisions are mandatory, as for 
example the limitations on turnover requirement when on the other hand 
there is a lot of the changes that are discretionary and optional for the 
contracting authorities or/and the Member States to apply. Therefore it is 
going to be interesting to see how the new Directive is implemented, and 
depending on how it is implemented there will be different outcomes and 
various effects on competition.  Additionally, it is going to be interesting to 
see whether ECJ are going to interpret the Directive in a more pro 
competitive way or not.   
 
As stated in the beginning the Green Paper emphasis the importance of 
creating the strongest possible competition and that distortion of competition 
must be avoided. A lot of the changes introduced in the Directive are 
capable of creating effective competition on the public market. Remarkably, 
the effort to avoid distortion of competition is not very apparent. The 
indirect effect of a few of the changes might be less distortion of 
competition but it does not seem to be the primary purpose. I am of the 
perception that the only change that is clearly introduced to fight anti 
competitive behaviour is the criteria for exclusion of tenderers in Article 57 
and the introduction of ESPD. There are a lot of other things that could have 
been implemented and productive on the path to eliminate, or at least reduce 
the risk of distortion of competition. In my view the legislator missed the 
chance to make such effort. One of the things that they could have 
implemented in the Directive is an obligation for the contracting authorities 
to report suspicions of bid rigging to their responsible National Competition 
Authority.336 A few Member States have discussed such mandatory 
provision337 and it is something that the Member States has discretion to 
implement in their national legislation. However, a mandatory provision on 
the reporting of suspicious bid rigging in the Directive could create 
harmonisation and enhance the enforcement of competition law. As part of 
the state the contracting authority should have a responsibility to report it 
since they are spending public funds. As mentioned, the leniency 
programmes has not reached its full potential on the public market and 
                                                
336 Along the same line see, Ølykke, Grith, “How should the Relation between Public 
Procurement Law and Competition Law Be Addressed in the new Directive”, Ølykke, 
Risvig and Tvarnø (eds), EU Procurement Directives - modernisation, growth & innovation 
2012, p 78., Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules 2011, p 380., and 
Spagnolo, Giancarlo, On behalf of the Swedish Competition Authority, “Open Issues in 
Public Procurement”, Report, 2009:7, p 16., Available at, 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/uppdragsforskning/fors
k_rap_2009-7_Issues_Procurement.pdf  
337 Swedish Competition Authority, “Konkurrensen i Sverige 2007”, Report 2009:7, p 225., 
Available at http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/rap_2007-
4.pdf  
 57 
therefore the focus and responsibility has been put on the contracting 
authorities instead.  
 
Even if the rules on public procurement are suppose to protect the suppliers 
they cannot be unreasonable since it is public funds being spent, there needs 
to be a balance. Reporting and revealing bid rigging is something that will 
be positive for competing suppliers not engaging in anti competitive 
behaviour.  
 
The reason for why there should be an obligation for the contracting 
authorities to report if they have suspicions is because of the lack of 
incentives. Even if there is a moral obligation to do it there are some 
uncertainties from my point of view that might stop them.338 One reason 
could be that it might cost the contracting authorities more to wait for an 
investigation and to start all over with the procurement process instead of 
just looking through the fingers and accepting the high price and live with 
the fact that they did not get the best value for money.  I am of the 
perception that there needs to be more focus on creating incentives for the 
contracting authority to unravel a bid rigging scheme. 
 
As mentioned, the Green Paper also raises the question on whether guidance 
is enough to combat anti competitive behaviour or if there is need for 
legislative instruments, such as the mandatory reporting of suspicious bid 
rigging. I am of the perception that guidelines are very helpful, however it is 
not certain that everyone cares about them.  The contracting authorities can 
have other interests than fighting anti competitive behaviour. Even if bid 
rigging counteracts the aim to achieve best value for money they do not 
have the resources, or they do not priorities their resources to detect bid 
rigging. Therefore I am of the view that legislative instruments are needed.  
Since the contracting authorities might be in conflict of interests, I am of the 
perception that the Directive could have been even more tightened and not 
allow as much discretion to the contracting authorities as in the new 
Directive. In such situations it would be preferable with fully harmonised 
rules.  
 
One of the risk factors for collusion, in relation to the market structure is the 
fact that there are few suppliers on the market. Even if the fact that there are 
few suppliers on the market is something that facilitates collusive agreement 
I do not think that the increased participation in itself are going to create 
effective competition. Of course it will generate in more competitors 
competing for each and every public contract but since experiences show 
that bid rigging schemes have been created and sustained for a long time 
with 100 members the high degree of participation is not going to be vital. I 
am of the perception that it is the lowered barriers to entry, which is also a 
factor affecting the possibility to collude, that will have an impact on the 
                                                
338 Along the same line see, Spagnolo, Giancarlo, On behalf of the Swedish Competition 
Authority, “Open Issues in Public Procurement”, Report, 2009:7, p 16., Available at, 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/uppdragsforskning/fors
k_rap_2009-7_Issues_Procurement.pdf  
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effective competition and the possibility to create and sustain a collusive 
agreement. If the barriers to entry are lowered and it is unproblematic to 
enter the market new competitors can enter and interrupt an already existing 
bid rigging scheme. Nor will it be as tempting to create a collusive 
agreement if there is a risk of new competitors entering the market 
competing with a lower price. The third risk factor in relation to the market 
structure is if there is a standardized product that is going to be purchased. 
However, this is something that is hard to affect.339  
 
To sum up, both the public procurement rules and the competition rules are 
essential for the creation of an internal market and anti competitive 
behaviour between the tenderers counteracts the goal of effective 
competition and best value for money. Therefore it is extremely important 
that the risk of collusion is eliminated to the extent possible. That is why it 
is important that the two systems reach coherence. However, most of the 
changes do not have as its primary purpose to fight distortion of 
competition, yet that is capable of being the indirect effect of most of the 
changes. Unfortunately there are not much in the legislation pointing direct 
toward the fighting of collusive agreements. The modernised rules on public 
procurement are a push towards a more competitive conscious system put 
there is still a long way to go. I am therefore of the perception that there is 
potential in the new Directive to create more effective competition on the 
public market, but it will definitely not be collusion proof.  
                                                
339 See chapter 4.1.1. 
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Annex A - Correlation Table 
 
 
2014/24/EU  2004/18/EC 
 
Art 18 para 1  Art 2 Principles of procurement 
 
Art 18 para 2  - Principles of procurement  
 
Art 46  (Art 9) Division of contracts into lots 
 
Art 58  Art 47 Selection criteria - turnover cap 
(Art 44)  
  
Art 57  Art 45 Exclusion grounds 
 
Art 59                                 -   European Single Procurement 
Document 
 
Art 61  - E-Certis 
 
Art 71  Art 25 Subcontracting 
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